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Summary 
This thesis aims to draw a picture on the implementation progress of the new 
pension policy initiated from mid-1990s in China. The recent pension reform wave, 
along with the economic reform of public firms, coincides with the recessions of 
state-owned enterprises, an obstacle for “social pooling and individual account” 
pension scheme. On the verge of bankruptcy of public firms, both firms and workers 
are in the economic morass. Existing studies mainly focused on macro 
decentralization theory and market theory and reasoned government’s failure to 
finance pension liabilities and notional individual accounts.  
In this study, original data collected in Tianjin shows a scenario different from 
former research works. Through the elaborations of M. S. Grindle’s framework on 
analyzing policy implementation, this thesis, focusing on micro-analysis, theorizes 
why individual workers in loss-making state enterprises pay their pension to promote 
the present pension scheme. Interviews were conducted in twenty-six public firms in 
Tianjin. By exploring the power structure, guanxi capital and social opportunities 
within the domestic socio-economic system, a model on local policy implementation 
context explains the reason on the illegal pension contribution process and sheds light 
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Chapter 1 
Cohesion or Conflict: A Study of China’s Pension Reform 
Policy implementation in transitional countries remains the most pressing 
challenge to their governments. The process of policy implementation has captured 
the government’s attention because it is evident that a wide variety of factors – from 
the availability of sufficient resources, to the commitment of lower level officials, to 
reporting mechanisms within the bureaucracy, to accidents of timing, luck, and to 
seemingly unrelated events – can and do frequently intervene between the statement 
of policy goals and their actual achievement.1 H. D. Lasswell wrote his book Politics: 
Who Gets What, When, How several decades ago, reminding us that even when a 
policy is successfully implemented, it involves far more than a mechanical translation 
of goals into routine procedures;2 it involves fundamental questions about conflict, 
decision making, and “who gets what” in a society.3  
A range of actors involved in the policy implementation process sets the policy 
implementation context and influences the policy content and outcome. A branch of 
the academic work on policy studies relies on the political economy of the power 
structure among different parts within a policy system.4 Following this branch, this 
thesis employs China’s pension reform (from 1997 onwards) as a case study to 
validate the theory on the importance of the policy implementation context. 
Offering pension to retired workers is a merit of socialist welfare states. 
                                                 
1 D. Van Meter and C. Van Horn, “The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual Framework,” 
Administration and Society, 6, No. 4 (February 1975): 446.  
2 Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1936) 
3 See M. S. Grindle, “Policy Content and Context in Implementation” in Politics and Policy 




Moreover, socialist countries are famous for its ubiquitous welfare to secure social 
equality. China had, until the late 1980s, maintained an urban- and enterprise-based 
Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG)5 system covering mainly state enterprises, including both 
state-owned enterprises and some collective enterprises. 6  Although it adequately 
served China’s planning economy for four decades, the conflict between enterprises’ 
social functions and their role as market players has become more and more acute as 
economic reforms hardened their budget constraints and forced many of them into 
financial distress. China’s recent pension reform (1997), which goes hand-in-hand 
with the restructuring of its public firms, reveals how the content and context of 
policy implementation interacts and shapes the ongoing process and ultimate outcome 
of the new pension scheme. 
1.1 Policy Implementation 
The question about how the political context of administrative action affects 
policy implementation is of interest to many scholars because they share a common 
concern about implementation itself. For these scholars 7 , implementation is an 
ongoing process consisting of a variety of actors, the ultimate outcome of which is 
determined by the content of a specific program being pursued and by the interaction 
of the involved actors within a given politico-administrative context. The task to 
analyze implementation is to develop generalizations about how and why the content 
                                                 
5 Social Security was designed in 1935 for a different world than the one we live in today. It is a "Pay-
As-You-Go" system, in which the benefits that go to current retirees come directly from the payroll 
taxes of current workers. The other system is a fully funded system, in which the benefits that go to 
current retirees come from the pension funds saved by the current retirees themselves. 
6 China’s pension system consists of two parts -- state enterprises and government institutions. This 
thesis only focuses on the pension reform in state enterprises. Pensions of civil servants are mostly 
covered by the annual government budgets on a Pay-As-You-Go system.  
7 For further readings in this branch, see David Zweig, Context and content in policy implementation: 
Household contracts in China, 1977-1983, (Florida International University, 1983); Randall Baker, 
Comparative Public Management: Putting U.S. Public Policy and Implementation in Context, (Praeger 
Publishers, 1994) 
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and contextual variables intervene in the implementation process based on case 
studies.  
This thesis aims to explore the pension policy implementation in China from 
1997 to 2002. Before assessing the topic in greater detail, it is useful to state more 
explicitly the definitions of policy content and policy context, and to consider why 
pension reform in China has been singled out as a focus out of all the reforms in 
China.  
Policy Content        
Policy content defines the intended beneficiaries (what the policy intends to 
do), execution of programs (how to pursue the policy outcome), site of 
implementation, and so forth. T. Lowi has pointed out that the kind of policy being 
made will have considerable impact on the kind of political activity stimulated by the 
policymaking process.8 Grindle applied this observation with equal validity to the 
implementation process, encouraging consideration of the “implementability” of 
various programs. 9  The emphasis on “implementability” draws attention to both 
policy content and policy implementation context of various programs. These specific 
features of a policy program will affect the policy outcome significantly.  
For example, changing policy content will cause behavior changes for 
intended beneficiaries as envisioned by the program.10 The difference in the degree of 
behavior changes is another way showing the effect of policy content upon its 
implementation. A good example is the research work comparing the case of 
                                                 
8 Theodore Lowi, “American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory,” World 
Politics, 16, No. 4 (July 1964) 
9 See M. S. Grindle, “Policy Content and Context in Implementation”: 32 
10 See M. S. Grindle and Thomas, J., Public choices and policy change: The Political Economy of 
Reform in Developing Countries (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991): 143 
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introducing new technologies for agricultural development with another case of 
providing housing for low-income groups.11 The former may require considerable 
behavioral adaptation and participation on the part of the recipients. In contrast, the 
latter requires little in the way of changed behavior patterns. Moreover, programs that 
are designed to achieve long-range objectives may be more difficult to implement 
than those with immediate advantages to the beneficiaries. If the policy directly 
affects target groups’ economic situation, sense of security and so forth, this policy 
would receive a small amount of support and participation. 
Policy content also dictates the site of implementation. 12  As the site of 
implementation becomes more dispersed, both geographically and organizationally, 
the task of executing a particular program becomes more difficult, given the increase 
in decisional units involved. For instance, it might be expected that implementing an 
economic development program would be far more onerous than executing a new 
program for primary school instruction. 
Decisions made during policy formulation may also indicate who is to be in 
charge of executing various programs. Such decisions can affect how the policy is 
pursued. 13  There may be, for example, differences in the capacity of various 
bureaucratic agencies to manage programs successfully. Some will have more active, 
professional, and dedicated personnel than others. Some will enjoy greater support 
from political elites and have greater access to resources, and some will be more able 
to cope with the range of demands made upon them. Therefore, the agency conducting 
the process may have a decisive impact on implementation. 
                                                 
11 Ibid:11 
12 Ibid: 178 
13 Hill, M. and Hupe P. Implementing Public Policy (London: Sage, 2002) 
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Policy Context  
Policy contexts vary across cultures and political regimes. As policy 
implementation theories14 reveal, policy context has inherent uncertainty along with 
the policy process, from policy-making to policy implementation.15 If policy reform is 
deemed as a linear model, the ultimate policy outcome is, either successfully or 
unsuccessfully, implemented depending on assorted environmental factors as shown 
in Figure 1.1. Even if a reform issue is well-designed for implementation, i.e., policy 
content is sufficiently studied and proved, the policy outcome is not definitely good 
since the policy environment, which is the policy context in this thesis, may affect the 
implementation process.  
Figure 1.1 The Linear Model of Policy Reform16      
 A rough linear model of the policy process is implicit in many analyses of or 
proposals for reform. According to this model, a reform will go through the following: 
a proposed reform gets on the agenda for government action, a decision is made on 
                                                 
14 Alexander, Ernest R “From Idea to Action: Notes for a Contingency Theory of the Public Policy 
Implementation Process”, Administration and Society, Vol. 16 No 4 (February 1985); also see Goggin, 
Malcolm L, Implementation Theory and Practice - Toward a Third Generation (Illinois: Brown Higher 
Education, 1990); Gunn, Professor L A., “Why is Implementation So Difficult?”, Management Services 
in Government (November 1978); Mazmanian, Daniel A & Sabatier, Paul, Effective Policy 
Implementation, (Lexington Books, Lexington, Massachusetts,1981) 
15 Ibid: Grindle and Thomas: 66 
















the proposal, and the new policy or institutional arrangement is implemented, either 
successfully or unsuccessfully. Discussions on why a policy can be successfully or 
unsuccessfully implemented have yielded several models analyzing the policy context 
with reference to the power structure and actors’ strategies.17 According to a general 
model of the politico-administrative process, policy implementation context 
includes:18 
- power, interests, and strategies of actors involved; 
- institution and regime characteristics; 
- compliance and responsiveness; 
 Evaluating policy context is a crucial task in understanding the outcome of a 
policy or program. Analysis of the implementation context of specific programs may 
imply assessing the “power capabilities” of the actors, their interests and strategies for 
achieving them, and the characteristics of the regime in which they interact.19  
For example, social participation in policy implementation is likely to be 
oriented toward individual or group demand making at the output phase of the policy 
process.20 This feature makes the analysis on policy context more complex due to 
policy demands from multiple interest groups.21 It requires researchers to aggregate 
the demands of individuals and interest groups within one analytic framework. The 
                                                 
17 Power structure is the hierarchical classification of the policy actors’ capacities. Actors’ strategies 
refer to the activities aiming to influence the actors’ power and capacities, such as negotiations, 
compromising and persistence. For further details, M. S. Grindle, “Policy Content and Context in 
Implementation,” in Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World, edited by M.S. Grindle 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1980.): 44-47 
18 Ibid. 
19 The term, “power capabilities,” is taken from C. Anderson, “The Latin American Political System,” 
in N. Uphoff and W. Ilchman, eds., The Political Economy of Development (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1972): 171 
20 Pressman, J.L. and Wildavsky, A. Implementation, 3rd edition (University of California Press, 1984)  
21 Multi-level demand model refers to policy demands from the multiple interest groups. For further 
details, see D. Van Meter and C. Van Horn, “The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual 
Framework,” Administration and Society, 6, No. 4 (February 1975): 446.  
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obstacle to construct such a framework emerges from the diversity across countries. 
Any demographic, economic, social and cultural factor would lead to a widely 
different policy context. Therefore, researchers on implementation contexts have 
emphasized the importance of distinguishing the specific implementation context in 
one country or region from another. This thesis mainly discusses the politico-
administrative context which includes the power structure, group interests and actor 
strategies in China’s recent pension reform.  
Policy content and context also shed light on a political economy approach 
explaining the policy process in terms of multi-power interplay22. Accordingly, this 
approach deals with various politically influential forces and interests and interactions 
within certain basic economic, social and demographic constraints and pressures. 
Therefore, pension reforms, as well as other reforms, cannot be seen merely in terms 
of their nature and feasibility. Reform outcome is heavily determined by deeper 
dynamics which are propelled not only by broad structural changes in the social, 
economic and political spheres, but also by the particular constellation of interests and 
perspectives which cluster around the particular policy issues like iron filings around 
a magnet.23 
1.2 Dynamics of China’s Recent Pension Reform (1997-2002) 
Going through the literature on China’s pension reform, one may first realize 
the significance of this topic. As China is aging drastically, the problem on old-age 
security attracts attention of scholars in their economic and social studies. 
                                                 
22 Weimer, D. and Vining, A., Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice  (New York: Prentice Hall 1999) 
23 Op. cit.: Grindle and Thomas: 87 
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Pressure from Population Aging 
Since 1976, China has experienced a major socio-economic change, with 
important repercussions on the status of its population structure. China, the world's 
most populous country, is now crowned with another title: one of the world's most 
rapidly aging nations. China’s demographic policy has been implemented for more 
than twenty years. It forces most of the Chinese families to have only one child. 
According to statistics from China’s population policy maker -- the National 
Population and Family Planning Commission (NPFPC), residents who are 65 or older 
had already reached 7.1 per cent of the overall population at the end of 2001. Figure 
1.2 reveals that the aging population is increasing drastically in China. 
Figure 1.2 Aging Populations in China: Dependency Ratio24 
(Source: China Daily, available from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-
08/21/content_367466.htm, accessed September 10, 2004.) 
NPFPC’s predictions indicate the proportion of the population 65 or older will 
surge to nearly 22-24 per cent by 2050. If translated into absolute numbers, that 
means China will boast a staggering 400 million elders over 65 by around 2050. 
Meanwhile, China's median age is set to advance substantially from about 30 years 
                                                 
24 Dependency ratio refers to the number of pensioners per 100 working-age workers. 
 9
old in 2000 to around 39 years old by 2025, exceeding that of the United States, 
according to United Nations Population Division (UNPD) projections.25  
The ongoing tempo of aging in China is far faster than what was witnessed in 
more developed regions of the world during the past three decades. Declining fertility 
rates, partly the result of national family planning policies, and prolonged life 
expectancies are the two main factors behind the aging crisis. "China is now a country 
with a very low fertility rate with its total rate consistently below the sub-replacement 
level since 1990," said Yu Xuejun, director of the Policy and Regulation Department 
at the NPFPC26. Simultaneously, the national average life expectancy grew from a 
mere 41 years in 1950 to 70 years in 2000.27  
As noted by one article discussing trends in aging of the urban population in 
Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai, aging is proceeding more rapidly in urban areas. 
Shanghai has the largest proportion of elderly which accounts for 15 per cent of the 
population. Shanghai's total population increased 1.14 per cent during 1953-1990, but 
the elderly population increased by 7.55 per cent. Beijing's elderly population grew 
from 8.2 per cent of total population to 10.27 per cent during 1979-90. The elderly 
population in Tianjin has increased by 20 per cent during the past twenty years. By the 
year 2000, the proportion of elderly will increase to 17.7 per cent in Shanghai, 14.6 
per cent in Beijing, and 12.7 per cent in Tianjin.28  
A related concern is the aging of the working population from 35 to 59 years 
                                                 
25 China Daily, “China Faces Elderly Dilemma”. Available from 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-08/21/content_367466.htm, accessed September 10, 
2004. 
26 Xuejun Yu, China’s Response to Demographic Pressures: The Aging Complex; available from 
http://www.inwent.org/ef-texte/kop5/yu.htm; accessed July 16, 2004 
27 Ibid. 
28 Zhai Z., “Urbanization and the Aging of Urban Population in China: Trend and Countermeasures”, 
China Journal of Population Science. Vol. 9 (1): 35-44. (Spring 1997) 
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old, which comprised almost 60 per cent of the total population in 2000. These 
workers pose a problem for the competitiveness of enterprises. New technologies will 
demand a more flexible work force and a younger working population. By 2030, these 
older workers will be among the aged. In 2030, the old-aged people will account for 
39.7 per cent, 35 per cent, and 29.5 per cent of the population in Shanghai, Beijing, 
and Tianjin, respectively. There will be 3.45 elderly people for every child and one 
elderly person for every 2.5 people.29 This dramatic shift in population structure is 
unprecedented in China. These cities will be beset with many problems in 
intergenerational support and the work force. Typically, families in these cities can be 
characterized as a 4-2-1 pattern consisting of four seniors, two middle-aged parents, 
and one child. China's cities will experience waves of population shifts: from an 
abundant labor supply to labor force shortage and severe aging.30 According to some 
estimates, population aging will first expand rapidly, then decline quickly over 20 
years, and then expand again in 10 years.31 These abrupt changes will exert negative 
effects on industrial adjustment, the social welfare system, and the stability of 
employment.  
Under the current aging tide, the pressure from population aging is apparent. 
The population dependency ratio32 increases from about 21 in 1995 to 44 around 2025 
and then rises again to nearly 70 in 2075. The system dependency ratio, namely, the 
number of pensioners per 100 contributors, decreases initially from 21 in 1995 to 15 
in 2000 when the pension coverage rate for the working age population extends from 
                                                 
29 Ibid: 38-41 
30 Sun Fei and Wang Quan, Labor Shortage in China: An Economic Perspective; available from 
http://blog.soufun.com/blog/post/289_92835.htm; accessed May 3, 2003. 
31 Ibid. 
32 For the explanation of this term, refer to footnote 23. 
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25 per cent to 38.5 per cent.33 This implies more contributors will join the pension 
pool in the near future. However, this system dependency ratio will quickly rebound 
to 35.1 in 2025, as the population structure and the pension system mature.34 If the 
young dependents are also taken into consideration, the total dependency rate will be 
in around 100 in 2025.  
These facts and problems will be aggravated by the difficulties face by 
Chinese state enterprises (also known as public firms)35. Table 1.1 from the China 
Statistical Yearbook (1990-2000) depicts the basic tendency of the working population 
covered by state pension scheme in urban China. The dependency ratio of the public 
firms has increased to 30.8 per cent in 2000, compared with 19.2 per cent in 1990. 
Therefore, financing old-age workers is a vital task for the Chinese government. 
                                                 
33 Loraine A. West, Pension Reform in China: Preparing for the Future, available from 
http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/ebsum97b.html, accessed June 30, 2001. 
34 Ibid. 
35 State Enterprises include state-owned enterprises (SOE) and collectively-owned enterprises (COE). 
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1990 52,000,000 4.6% 31% 10,000,000 10% 19.2% 
1992 78,000,000 6.6% 45% 17,000,000 NA 21.8% 
1995 87,000,000 7.2% 46% 22,000,000 19.5% 25.3% 
1997 87,000,000 7.0% 43% 25,000,000 NA 28.7% 
1999 95,000,000 7.6% 45% 30,000,000 NA 31.6% 
2000 104,000,000 8.2% 50% 32,000,000 23.5% 30.8% 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1990-2000. (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1990, 1992, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2000) 
                                                 
36 Workers covered refer to the workers covered by China’s current pension scheme.   
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China’s Social Security Model 
China has different social welfare systems in urban and rural areas. In the 
urban area, the social welfare system covers mainly the workers of state enterprises 
and part of the urban population. On the contrary, rural areas do not have a systematic 
social welfare system to protect peasants. Although this thesis mainly focuses on the 
urban pension system, it remains to be noted that China’s welfare system, including 
pension, medical and unemployment insurance are extremely deficient in rural areas. 
As showed in Table 1.2 below, there are several ministries in charge of different kinds 
of welfare subsidies. However, existing welfare subsidies in pension are far from 
sufficiently meeting urban and rural people’s demands. In the table, the deficiencies of 
pension in rural areas are apparent.  
Most scholars agree that the rural population is living without government 
care and a subsidized pension system.37 Only until most recently, the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs (MCA) provides social assistance for a very small portion of the rural 
population. That program is the ‘local minimum livelihood line’ pioneered by MCA. 
It is a mechanism for determining the entitlement to social assistance. As a major 
social assistance program in rural parts, ‘local minimum livelihood line’ remained in 
place until early 1990s. At present, it is also being developed in some selected cities.38 
 
‘Local minimum livelihood line’ started in 1991 when the State Commission 
for Restructuring the Economic System (SCRES) established a rural pension system 
based on individual pension payment capacities. Prior to this, no pension scheme was 
implemented in China’s rural areas. The new policy allowed rural people above 30 
                                                 
37 Lutz Leisering and Gong Sen, “Old-Age Pensions for Rural China? From Land Reform to 
Globalization”, Report for the State Development Planning Commission (SDPC) , Peoples Republic of 
China, Asian Development Bank, Beijing, 2001 
38 Ministry of Civil Affairs, Decision on Country-level Pension Scheme, available from 
http://www.molss.gov.cn/correlate/mbf19922.htm, accessed April 3, 2003. 
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years old to join this pension system. This new pension system had no difference from 
a pure commercial pension insurance scheme. It emphasized that the family played an 
important role in supporting elderly people in traditional rural areas. Due to the small 
amount of participants in this system, the government decided to enlarge the 
participation. The amended policy greatly lowered the age limit. Newly born children 
were also included by the new program. This measure indeed helped in promoting the 
number of participants in the implementation process. However, due to the 1997 
Asian Financial Crisis, politicians and bureaucrats considered the pension insurance a 
risky investment. They cancelled the rural pension scheme, giving the excuse that it 
was immature to implement.39 
                                                 
39 Lutz Leisering and Gong Sen, “Old-Age Pensions for Rural China? From Land Reform to 
Globalization” 
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Table 1.2 Urban Social Security Systems 
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Compared with the rural pension policy, urban workers should feel fortunate in 
view of the government’s full welfare subsidies. Urban welfare is financed and organized 
primarily through state-owned and collectively-owned enterprises (SOEs and COEs) and 
public institutions. A wide range of benefits are provided including housing, health care, 
education, pension and childcare. Most full-time workers40 in state (and later non-state) 
enterprises have been receiving basic medical, workplace injury, maternity, and 
retirement benefits since the early 1950s, when the new government of the People’s 
Republic of China issued regulations on “labor insurance” that encompassed various 
forms of insurance.41 The most significant of these measures was old-age or pension 
insurance for virtually all workers.42 This and other forms of labor insurance were to be 
financed from payroll deductions. During the 1950s, enterprise unions, branches of the 
All-China Federation of Trade Union (ACFTU) had the administrative responsibility of 
collecting labor insurance fees and then turning these over to the higher level regional 
branches of the ACFTU. As noted by scholars on Chinese trade unions, the ACFTU not 
only acted as an institution of representation and participation to serve as in integral 
component of the party machine, but also tried to push for a more autonomous role for 
                                                 
40 Beginning in 1951, pensions were guaranteed to all state-sector workers when they retired at age 55 for 
women and 60 for men. Payments were set at a comparatively high level: roughly 80-90 per cent of the 
workers’ salary at retirement. Though inflation has eroded retirement benefits over the years, causing many 
retirees to complain that they can no longer live off them, the obligation of state-owned enterprises to 
provide pensions has not been lifted. See William Hurst and Kevin J. O’Brien, China’s Contentious 
Pensioners, The China Quarterly, June 2002. Volume 170: 345-360. 
41 These provisions were based on the 1951 “People’s Republic of China Labor Insurance Regulations,” 
with revisions in 1953, 1958, and 1978 to expand the scope of coverage and to adjust the way pensions 
were calculated. See Han and Jiao 1997: pp. 4-7, and Xie and Ba 1999: pp. 199-133 
42 See Mark W. Frazier. "The Unfunded Mandate of Heaven: The Center, the Cities, and the Politics of 
Pension Reform in China." Paper Proceedings at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the American Political 
Science Association, Boston, August 29 - September 1, 2002. 
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the ACFTU，giving priority to the interests of workers.43 Therefore, at that moment, 
retirees received their funds from union accounts rather than the enterprises themselves. 
During the Cultural Revolution, the ACFTU and the Ministry of Labor were 
abolished, so was the unified pooling of retirement pensions. Social insurance thus 
became the responsibility of enterprises. The pension funds that had accumulated in the 
master fund were used for other purposes44, eliminating any pre-funding that had built 
up.45 Supervisory responsibilities of the pension funds were transferred to local labor 
bureaus, while responsibility for managing payments was transferred to enterprises. 
Pooling ended and so did pre-funding, since each enterprise paid the pension of its own 
workers out of its current revenues.  
However, the pension scheme has been deteriorating in recent years due to the 
poor business performance of state enterprises in China. Salaries for workers in state 
enterprise were in arrears. In some regions, unprofitable enterprises could not afford to 
pay pensions for retirees. Therefore, pension protests have been spreading widely in 
China, especially in the traditional industrial regions. The Chinese government is fully 
aware of the situation since the urban working class is a principal supporting force of the 
state regime. Working-class protests flared up in one Chinese city after another and 55 
per cent of the incidents were centered on issues related to wage arrears, pension and 
“livelihood difficulties”. A further 26 per cent were based on grievances involving “poor 
                                                 
43 Lee Lai To, Trade Unions in China: 1949 to the Present (National University of Singapore, 1986). Also 
see Ng Sek Hong and Malcom Warner. China's Trade Unions and Management (London: Macmillan. 1998) 
44  Yue Guo, China’s Pension System Reform, available from http://www.gu.edu.au/school/gbs/ 
irl/working_party/Papers/Guo_2_.pdf; accessed November 21, 2004 
45 Pre-funding system was the pension system in the AFTCU management period. See Ng Sek Hong and 
Malcom Warner, op.cit, 22-25 
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labor relations” or “illegal dismissals.”46 As Hurst and O’Brien described in their article, 
the prominence of pension protests became especially apparent in many state enterprises 
in industrial cities, such as Benxi and Datong.47 There were signs that this pattern also 
held true in other cities. One worker interviewed by Marc Blecher, for instance, reported 
that “the people who protest down at City Hall are just old workers who are not receiving 
their pensions.”48 
Pension reform: a high priority 
China's pension reform has entered a critical stage. Various officials and experts 
report that it is very important to model the new system carefully to ensure the success of 
the social security system.49 China’s pension reform has become the top priority of the 
government reform agenda and is a widely discussed topic. Without the success of the 
pension reform, the whole economic reform cannot move forward and would even end up 
in failure. 
China's present pension system was adopted in the 1990s in a number of 
provinces and cities. It consists of social pooling and individual fund accumulation, with 
money coming from employers and employees. Employers and employees must deposit 
money into the accounts regularly. However, the social pooling system has always been 
short of money because some enterprises or government institutions do not have enough 
money and some funds have been diverted to non-social security uses.  
                                                 
46 Blecher, Marc J. “Hegemony and Workers’ Politics in China”. The China Quarterly 2002.Vol 170: 8 
47 William Hurst and Kevin J. O’Brien, “China’s Contentious Pensioners”, The China Quarterly, June 2002. 
Volume 170: 345-360 
48 Blecher, Marc J., op.cit.  
49 China Daily, Lottery Jackpot Joy for the Elderly. Available from 
http://www.globalaging.org/health/world/lottery.htm; accessed August 20, 2002 
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Individually accumulated funds were often transferred to social accounts to pay 
pensions to retired people. Individual accounts were drained dry, said a top official with 
the State Commission for Restructuring Economic Systems' Institute on Economic 
System and Management.50 The situation is growing more acute because the proportion 
of China's elderly population to the total population is getting larger by the day.  
In addition to cash shortage, there are other problems with China's present 
pension system. Problems include the inability to make contributions, inaccurate records, 
lack of proper supervision, lack of a developed regulatory framework, and reluctance to 
participate in the system for certain industries. Therefore, it becomes an urgent task to set 
up a uniform, standardized and comprehensive national pension system in China.51  
Experts interested in China’s pension reform emphasize that the first step should 
be working out a pension model and a development strategy that suits China's own 
situation.52 However, there is no existing social insurance or pension model that can 
exactly fit China's needs. Difficulties exist in forming a national system in China 
covering provinces and municipalities engaged in different stages of development with 
different short-term needs. Experts from the World Bank suggested that China could 
reach a solution by combining the best of the pension models worldwide, including that 
in Australia, Chile, Singapore and United States. 53  They argued that, unlike PAGY 
system which uses this generation's money to support the elderly generation, the pension 
systems in most of these countries are based on funded accumulation systems where 
                                                 
50 Interview was conducted in December, 2003. 
51 China Daily, “Pension Problems Probed”, August 6, 2000; available from 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/chinagate/doc/2000-08/06/content_247147.htm; accessed October 21, 2002. 
52 Ibid. 
53 US Ministry of Social Security. Global Social Security: 1995. (Beijing: Huaxia Publishings. 1996) 
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funds can grow and each individual will see to the development of his/her own account.  
However, one other critical issue for China is how to invest the pension fund in 
the capital market to raise more money. World Bank experts recommended four points: 
(1) paying all arrears of outstanding pensions immediately; (2) enforcing participation in 
the new system and the timely payments of contributions, (3) establishing a pension 
supervisory body on par with the central bank, namely, the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC), and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC), 
independent of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and Ministry of Labor and Social Security 
(MOLSS); and (4) encouraging both domestic and foreign companies to enter the pension 
fund market.54 
So far, China's pension funds can only be invested in treasury bonds and bank 
deposits which cannot render significant returns. This runs counter to the international 
practice.55 The World Bank insisted that investing pension funds on the capital market 
not only boosts development of the market, but also helps fund state infrastructure 
construction. However, this point of view remains to be controversial given the fact that 
China's securities market is still immature with lots of irregular behavior. As such, it is 
still unsafe to invest pension funds in the capital market directly. 
1.3 Issues and Research Hypothesis 
What has happened to the pension reform of China in the last decade? For a start, 
                                                 
54 The World Bank, World Bank Report 1998, available from 
http://www.worldbank.org/html/extpb/annrep98/human.htm, accessed September 12, 2003. 
55 Wang, Yan, Dianqing Xu, Zhi Wang, and Fan Zhai., “Implicit Pension Debt, Transition Cost, Options and 
Impact of China’s Pension Reform: A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis”, World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper series. 2000. 
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this study observes and discusses the status of China’s recent pension reform. Previous 
studies have presented a clear picture of a series of pension policies before the reform. 
However, very few studies have touched on the most recent reform and its social impacts 
at the micro level. Based on a 4-month field study on pension policy implementation in 
Tianjin, this thesis, based on the policy implementation theory, aims to explain why the 
new pension scheme, which had been initiated by the World Bank and other economists, 
appears to be running smoothly in Chinese state enterprises, even in those loss-making 
public firms which fail to protect the workers’ pension rights and interests.  
This thesis uses basically the qualitative research method. Information gathered 
from interviews and observations will be analyzed in a descriptive way. Interviews are 
from three fieldwork investigations. In the first investigation, a small pilot study was 
conducted among policy-makers and government officials in four cities in China -- 
Qingdao, Tianjin, Wenzhou and Shenyang in May 2001. Evidence collected from these 
cities gave a detailed depiction of policy implementation in state enterprises and exposed 
the failure of the new pension scheme in terms of protecting welfare justice of the weak, 
especially in traditional industrial state enterprises.  
In December 2002, the second investigation was conducted in Tianjin. Face-to-
face interviews were conducted with eight government officials in Tianjin government 
agencies dealing with social security, public finance, and trade unions. It was revealed 
that laid-off workers (LOWs) in the loss-making enterprises were paying the share of 
pension to their host enterprises. Most of these workers do not receive salary from their 
enterprises after being laid-off. It is puzzling to note the absolute compliance of these 
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poor workers in submitting their share of pension contributions to their enterprises. Poor 
Chinese pensioners56 did not protest or oppose the government in urging them to pay for 
the pension. Sometimes they sporadically appeal to some government institutions (e.g., 
the government information office, xin fang ban)57 or appeal to the courts. Evidently, 
pension responsibilities of some state enterprises have been transferred to their 
employees. 
Continuing the research on pension policy implementation in loss-making public 
firms, a three-month fieldwork was conducted in Tianjin in the third investigation. The 
investigation targets included seventeen SOEs and nine COEs. The size of these 
enterprises varies from below fifty people to more than three thousand people. The 
business performances among them also vary. Managers with responsibility for labor and 
welfare issue (lao zi chu/ke or ren li zi yuan bu) in those firms were interviewed on 
pension sources and management. Several dozen workers were also randomly 
interviewed. Among them, fifteen accepted in-depth interviews. Finally, two government 
officials from the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MOLSS) at local levels and 6 
functionaries from the Tianjin Social Insurance Funds Management Center (TJSI)58 at the 
district-level social insurance agencies (SI) were interviewed.59 
In the shadow of the continuous business difficulties of state enterprises, the new 
pension scheme should not have worked well in financing their pension pool sufficiently. 
                                                 
56 See William Hurst and Kevin O’Brien, “China’s contentious pensioners”, The China Quarterly, Vol 170, 
June 2002: 345-360. 
57 According to the interviewees in MOLSS, information sector basically deals with the appealing letter and 
requests from the ordinary people. They are in charge of helping local government to reply those requests 
and appeals.  Interviews were conducted on December 23, 2003. 
58 SI is used as a code for all district level social insurance agencies. 
59 Tianjin is a provincial level city. It is equal to a province and the districts are equal to cities and counties 
in other provinces. 
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SOEs/COEs’ capital assets and their zero-profits would not allow them to pay the 
pension fees for their employees. However, some cities with many loss-making 
SOEs/COEs in China are working quite smoothly in implementing the new pension 
policy. The study seeks to investigate and analyze who pays the pension fees if the 
SOEs/COEs cannot afford them and why the payers pay for them. 
This study would focus on a three-party relationship among the government 
(including TJSI 60  and TJBOLSS), enterprises and individual workers under the 
framework of actor strategies. Why do some workers need to pay pension to their host 
enterprises? How and why did these phenomena exist for a long period? What are the 
government’s reactions to workers’ petitions?  A verbal unrestrictive model61 on the 
interactions of these three parts will be presented.  This model will illustrate the pension 
implementation process and be used to identify the real policy context and the politico-
institutional factors. Systematic findings can be deduced through an in-depth policy 
implementation analysis. Although the fieldwork in Tianjin can by no means represent 
the whole of China, a micro-level analysis of the situation will add insights to the existing 
literature on China’s pension reform. In addition, this research aims to raise more 
research questions on state enterprise reform and also challenge some theories on 
enterprise-worker interactions in Chinese state enterprises.  
                                                 
60 In this study TJSI will be treated as a government institution since the staff working for TJSI will enjoy 
the same salary level and position level as civil servants. However, strictly speaking, TJSI is not a 
government institution. The staffs there are not attributed to civil servant category. 
61 Game theory models can be classified as quantitative model and verbal model. Verbal model refers to a 
game theory model without quantifying the player’s importance and strategies taken. Unrestrictive models 
refer to non-zero sum games or open-ended games. For details, see Game Theory and Decision Theory in 
Agent-Based Systems, edited by Simon Parsons, Piotr Gymtrasiewicz, and Michael Wooldridge (Boston, 
Massachusetts: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002) 
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1.4 Methodology 
In this thesis, the analysis is based on case studies in one provincial-level city, 
namely, Tianjin. Twenty-six state enterprises capturing the variance of policy 
implementation processes in the same policy framework will be presented. The emphasis 
of this thesis is on descriptive analysis. 
To help describe the dependent variable, namely, policy outcomes, three cohorts 
of enterprises investigated in the field study will be used. They are: 
- Profitable state enterprises 
- Barely surviving state enterprises 
- Loss-making state enterprises 
This thesis only selects state enterprises as investigation targets because workers 
in these firms constitute the majority of the Chinese urban labor force. Figure 1.3 shows 
the structure of Chinese urban workers. Even with the reduced workers in urban areas in 
recent years, they are still the majority compared with other economic sectors.  
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Table 1.3 State Sector Employments in China: 1978-2002 
Year State Enterprise Workers 
(Million) 
Percentage of  
state enterprise workers in 
the whole urban labor 
force 
1978 74.51 78% 
1980 80.19 76% 
1984 86.37 71% 
1986 93.33 70% 
1988 99.84 70% 
1992 108.89 70% 
1994 112.14 67% 
200262 81 52% 
(Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 1980-2003. Beijing: China Statistics Publishing. 1980-2003) 
Selecting Tianjin as the only city for case study may dampen external validity of 
the findings and affects the generalizations and analysis. However, a deeper investigation 
of Tianjin is productive for the following reasons. 
1. Based on two preliminary investigations63, Tianjin captures the main features of 
China’s traditional industrial cities, especially the industrial cities in Northeast China. 
Studying the pension reform in cities like Tianjin means examining problems of pension 
reform in a large part of the country. Before the free-market economic reforms, state 
enterprises in these industrial cities, on behalf of the central government, provided 
pension and other social welfare for the elderly. However, due to the tight financial 
budget faced by the central government, subsidies to those enterprises were no longer 
provided to state enterprises. Therefore, these cities were quite similar in terms of facing 
financial difficulties to pay pension to workers during the transitional period. In the 
                                                 
62 In 2002, workers in the non-state sectors are seventy-four million people, which occupied 48% of the 
whole urban labor force. 
63  First investigation was conducted in December 2002. Second investigation was conducted between 
November, 2003 and January 2004. 
  27
meantime, majority of the population in these cities remains to be urban workers. 
Examining their pension status will help promote the understanding of pension welfare of 
the urban populations.  
2. The stage of economic development in Tianjin is in the middle of the country. 
According to the China Statistical Yearbooks (1997-2002), most important economic 
indicators (e.g., average income level, GDP and market price) of Tianjin rank in the 
median position, from 17-26 among 32 provinces in China. Understanding the pension 
reform in this city may promote the understanding of average economic indicators 
affecting the progress of pension reform in other similar cities.  
3. Another reason to select Tianjin is because of its political stability. Although, 
workers’ movements were occasionally occurring in this city owing to the issue of laid-
off workers, salaries in arrears and insufficient pension, Tianjin is still the most stable 
place in China from the 1980s. It provides a stable and ideal environment for this study to 
observe workers in public firms and also government officials without considering other 
intervening factors. 
4. The recession of public firms in Tianjin is similar to those in other parts of 
Northeast China. Although the government has recognized that state enterprises cannot be 
profitable without shedding their social welfare responsibilities and trying to find new 
ways of providing social safety nets, the business performance of state enterprises in 
these traditional heavy/light industrial cities across China is bad as showed in Table 1.4. 
  28
Table 1.4 State-owned Industrial Enterprises Losses in China, 1978 -1996  
 
 Enterprises losing money ( per cent of 
total SOEs in China) 
Losses (RMB billions) 
1978 - 4.2 
1980 19.2 3.4 
1982 20.8 4.8 
1984 10.2 2.7 
1986 13.1 5.4 
1988 10.9 8.2 
1990 27.6 34.9 
1993 30.3 45.3 
1994 - 48.3 
1996 - 79.1 
(Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 1980-1997. Beijing: China Statistics Press. 1980-1997) 
 Fiscal subsidies from the central government and local governments are 
significantly decreasing in the continual poor performance of state enterprises in the 
1990s. Both the central and local governments decided to invest more in the profitable 
large-scale enterprises instead of spending funds on all of the state enterprises. Therefore, 
for loss-making SOE/COEs in China, the need to decrease in scale to avoid further losses 
is apparent. Table 1.5 and Table 1.6 show the reducing subsidies to loss-making SOEs 
and SOE liabilities during the recent years. 
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Fiscal Subsidies to Loss-
making state enterprises 
/Budget Expenditures 
from the central 
government (Per cent) 
Fiscal Subsidies to 
Loss-making state 
enterprises / GDP 
(Per cent) 
1985 50.7 25 5.7 
1986 32.5 15 3.2 
1987 37.6 17 3.1 
1988 44.6 18 3 
1989 59.9 21 3.5 
1990 57.9 19 3.1 
1991 51 15 2.4 
1992 44.5 12 1.7 
1993 41.1 9 1.2 
1994 36.6 6 0.8 
1995 32.8 5 0.6 
1996 33.7 4 0.5 
(Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 1986-1997. Beijing: China Statistics Press. 1980-1997) 
 
Table 1.6 Liabilities of SOEs in China (Per cent of Assets, 1978-1995) 
 All SOEs Industrial SOEs 
1978 NA 11 
1980 NA 19 
1988 NA 45 
1989 55 NA 
1990 58 NA 
1991 61 NA 
1992 62 NA 
1993 72 68 
1994 75 79 
1995 85 NA 
(Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 1980-1996. Beijing: China Statistics Press. 1980-1996) 
 
1.6 Organization of the Thesis 
Chapter one has opened the topic by re-visiting the analytic framework of policy 
content and context. It has also described briefly the dynamics of the new pension policy 
and its implementation in China under the analytic framework.  
Chapter two will recount the history of China’s pension reform and initiation of a 
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new pension scheme. It also explores the advantages and failures of the newly-designed 
pension policy. Adopting the research design conducted in other transitional countries,64 
this study will follow the same design in examining the case in Tianjin.  
Chapter three will focus on Tianjin. It will examine the distorted policy 
implementation in pension reform in the city. Having examined Tianjin’ economic 
development, especially its loss-making public firms, this thesis attempts to look into the 
impact of policy content factors on the pension reform process.  
Owing to the explanatory limitation of policy content factors, this research turns 
its attention to the politico-administrative context affecting pension policy 
implementation. By elaborating on the power structure, guanxi capital and economic 
opportunities among state enterprises, individual workers and government institutions, 
Chapter four reveals a relationship map among the actors in the implementation process. 
However, no solutions have been proposed to solve the current dilemma for workers in 
loss-making public firms. Nonetheless, the study highlights the need to pay more 
attention to workers’ rights in Chinese state enterprises. 
Chapter five will conclude the research project and indicate the implications for 
the existing literature and analytical theories in pension reform. It also recommends 
further studies or exploration of China’s pension system in public firms. 
                                                 
64 Marcus Andrew Melo, “Institutional Choice and the Diffusion of Policy Paradigms: Brazil and the 
second wave of pension reform”,. International Political Science Review/ Revue internationale de science 
pol.2004, 25: 320-341. World Bank Human Resources Development and Operations, “Social Security: 
Promise and Pitfalls in Privatization Experiences From Latin America”, HRO DISSEMINATION NOTES 
Policy Number 10, July 12, 1993; also see McGreevey, W.. “Social Security in Latin America”, World 
Bank Discussion Paper 110 , 1990;  McGreevey, W. "Social Security: Promise & Pitfalls in Privatization." 
Paper presented at the 1993 Conference on Social Security and Pension Fund Reform in Latin America, 




Revisiting the Role of Socialist Welfare: Transformations of  
the Old-Age Security System 
Immediately after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, 
the Chinese government initiated a socialist pension system in the urban areas. These 
series of pension policies were carried out by the central government and state enterprises 
for more than fifty years. However, in the late 1990s, it was abolished by Chinese policy-
makers due to the large-scale pension debts and also the exacerbated financial difficulties 
in the state-controlled businesses.  In order to solve these problems, scholars and policy-
makers have provided plenty of discussions and solutions to build up a new pension 
system in the last decade. This chapter will trace the policy reform history in urban China 
and elaborate on the theoretical literatures on promoting the new pension reform. 
2.1 A Brief Historical Overview of Pension Reform since the 1950s 
From the 1950s to the Cultural Revolution 
China’s first pension system was established in 1951 under a series of regulations 
on labor insurance set by the State Council. The regulations were applied to enterprises 
with more than one hundred workers in cities and towns. Not surprisingly, it was a small 
program, since the enterprise sector was small and there were few retirees. One year after 
the program started, there were only eight million enterprise workers and twenty 
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thousand retirees, or about four hundred workers per retiree.65 
The system was administered by the All China Federation of Trade Unions 
(ACFTU)66, a national workers’ union directly under the supervision of the CCP which 
acted as the labor bureau at the local level. Under this system, contributions were made 
by the state enterprises, but the ACFTU also made contributions if the enterprise 
contributions fell short of the requirements. A contribution rate at 3 per cent of the wage 
bill by all employers was sufficient to finance the system on a largely PAYG basis. Old-
age pension was provided at a replacement rate of 50 to 70 per cent of workers’ wages. 
The ACFTU managed both the local payment procedures and the master fund. 
Subsequent reforms expanded the coverage. In 1955, the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) issued the Temporary Regulations on Retired Employees in Government in order 
to establish a separate system for employees of government units, non-profit units and 
party organizations. In 1958, the Temporary Regulations on Retirement of Workers and 
Staff dealt with both enterprise and government workers, extending coverage to 
enterprises with fewer than one hundred workers. This system continued until the 
Cultural Revolution in 1966. 
During the Cultural Revolution, the ACFTU and the Ministry of Labor were 
abolished, so was the unified pooling of retirement pensions. Social insurance thus 
became the responsibility of enterprises. The pension funds that had accumulated in the 
                                                 
65 Andrew Walder,  Communist Neo-traditions: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry (University of 
California Press, 1998): 33-57 
66 Lee Lai To, Trade Unions in China: 1949 to the Present (National University of Singapore, 1986). 
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master fund were used for other purposes67. Supervisory responsibilities were transferred 
to local labor bureaus, while responsibility for managing payments was transferred to 
enterprises. Pooling ended and so did pre-funding, since each enterprise paid the pension 
of its own workers out of current revenues. 
Post Cultural Revolution Reform 
When the Deng Xiaoping-inspired economic reforms began in 1978, the 
government took further initiatives to develop a social security system consistent with the 
rest of the economy. The State Council issued new pension regulations (State Council 
Document No. 104) for the SOEs, government workers and non-profit organizations, and 
recommended large COEs to follow the same rules. 
The prevailing retirement ages were reaffirmed to be sixty for men and fifty-five 
for women, with additional adjustments for hazardous jobs 68 . Qualifications for 
retirement were eased, allowing a worker to retire after ten years of continuous service 
rather than twenty.  Higher benefits were given. They are related to the length of service 
and to the final standard wage. Individuals who had worked for at least twenty years 
continuously would receive a pension of 75 per cent of the standard wage; individuals 
who had worked for between fifteen and twenty years would receive a 70 per cent of the 
standard wage as pension; and those who had worked for between ten and fifteen year 
would be given a 60 per cent of the standard wage as pension. There was a minimum 
guaranteed pension of thirty RMB per month, the subsistence income level at that time. 
                                                 
67 Yue Guo, China’s Pension System Reform; available from 
http://www.gu.edu.au/school/gbs/irl/working_party/Papers/Guo_2_.pdf; accessed November 21, 2004 
68 For example, women whose jobs belong to physically strenuous job category retire at 50 years old. 
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Summary of the Old Pension System 
In a communist economy, employment in the state enterprise was not only a 
market relationship. It was a position that established the worker’s social identity and 
rights to the specific distributions and welfare entitlements provided by the state. 69 
Moreover, the enterprise exercised authority not only over one highly specialized role of 
the workers, but over the whole person. As noted by Andrew Walder, “the state factory is 
a branch of government and, through the factory’s party branch, exerts a measure of the 
state’s political rule over the worker as a citizen.”70  China implemented the typical 
socialist welfare system. All workers were dependent on their enterprises for the 
satisfaction of their needs. That was the material basis of industrial authority; it provided 
what Weber called “interests in obedience.”71  
The Recent Pension Reform: Implementation Problems 
The 1978 Regulations created a number of problems that subsequently had to be 
addressed. One problem was the inequality of the pension burden between newer 
enterprises in developing regions with a young work force, and older enterprises where 
the ratio of pensioners to active workers reached the ratio of 1:1. Another problem was 
that the Regulations were clearly intended to encourage early retirement in order to create 
jobs for a large influx of new workers into the urban labor force. Among the incentives 
were increased retirement benefits, a lowering of the minimum years of service required 
                                                 
69 Andrew Walder,  Communist Neo-traditions: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry (University of 
California Press, 1998): 33-57 
70 Ibid: p.60 
71 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (University of California Press 
1978) 
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to qualify for retirement, and, for a time, the guarantee of a job for one child of each 
parent who was willing to retire early. The number of retirees jumped five-fold from 1978 
to 1985, and pension costs rose from 2.8 per cent of the urban wage bill to 10.6 per cent. 
As the increase in pension costs became apparent, the incentive to encourage retirement 
was diminished.72 
Other problems persisted longer. Basing the pension on the final standard wage 
provided an incentive for workers and employers to lift up the final wage in preparation 
for retirement. The 1978 Regulations provided a generous replacement rate relative to the 
standard wage, which was the largest part of the wage at that time. Subsequently, labor 
reforms have increased bonuses to the extent that the standard wage is perhaps only one 
half of the total wage compensation. While this should have reduced the effective 
replacement rate and thus helped control the rise of pension costs, actual benefits may be 
more generous than the rules suggest.73  
Pooling at the Enterprise and Municipal Level 
Reforms as stipulated by regulations since 1985 have focused on the pension 
design. State Council Document No. 77 (1986) established the pooling system across the 
state enterprises on a limited basis at the municipal level. Enterprises retained the 
responsibility of distributing pensions. The pool operated with a set contribution rate for 
participating enterprises. If the pension costs of an enterprise were less than the 
                                                 
72 Guo Chongde. 1993. Pension Insurance in China: Reform and Prospects. Papers presented at the 
Workshop on “Social Security in the People’s Republic of China”, Hamburg. February 5-7, 1993 
73 See Estelle James, “How Can China Solve Its Old-age Security Problem? The Interaction Between 
Pension, SOE and Financial Market Reform”, Proceedings on the Conference Financial Market Reform in 
China, Massachusetts, September 11-13, 2001 
  36
contribution rate, the difference was remitted to the pool. If pension costs were higher, 
the pool would cover the difference. (State Council Document No. 77) 
Contract Workers 
The 1986 pension reforms were accompanied by employment reforms that 
established labor contracts. New workers were hired on a three- to five- year contract 
basis with terms of employment set by the state or by contract, while current workers 
continued as permanent workers. Although the contracts specified that the employer held 
the right not to renew the contract upon expiration, they were renewed generally. 
Separate pension pools were established for contract workers and permanent workers. 
Contract workers made individual contributions, while permanent workers initially did 
not. Enterprises contributed to both pools. 
Pooling Extended to COEs and Others 
In the late 1980s, pooling was extended to workers in the COEs in many cities. 
Since then, other enterprise types, such as joint ventures, joint stock companies, and 
foreign enterprises, have been brought into the pension pools in some cities, although 
participation is generally far from complete. Some provinces are moving toward 
provincial level pooling, generally only for state enterprise workers. However, 
participation at that level remains fragmentary. 
Introduction of the Three-tier System 
In 1991, based on pilot studies in selected cities and provinces, the State Council 
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issued Document No. 33 entitled ‘Decision on the Reforms of the Pension Insurance 
System for Employees in the Chinese Enterprise’. This Document called for the pooling 
of pension insurance at the municipal level, with costs to be shared by individuals, 
enterprises and the state. It also called for the expansion of pooling and the establishment 
of three tiers in the pension system. As Document No. 33 stated, the three tiers were: a 
basic benefit, a supplementary benefit to be provided by those enterprises in sound 
financial condition, and a benefit based on individual savings. The responsibility of 
managing the whole system was given to the Ministry of Labor at all levels. 
Reform Objectives Specified 
In subsequent years, the system of social pooling and individual accounts was 
further studied in light of China’s local conditions, leading to the State Council Document 
No. 6 entitled ‘Notice on Deepening the Reforms of the Pension Insurance System’ in 
1995. This Document clearly stated the objectives of the reform to be a broadening of 
coverage, the setting up of a multi-level system 74  and strengthening of pension 
management. 
2.2 1997: Revitalizations of the Failing “Centrally-Planned” Pension Scheme 
Similar to the other reform measures in China, pension reform also adopted the 
approach of “crossing the river by touching stones.”75 The reform was carried out with 
the full attention of the central government since 1997. It is not easy for the government 
to implement the new policy for three reasons. Firstly, the old economic policy and one-
                                                 
74 A multi-level system refers to the divided pension system managed respectively by central government, 
provincial government and local government. 
75 Deng Xiaoping initiated this phase in 1993 when he investigated Shenzhen, a city in South China. 
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child birth policy led to the pension crisis triggered by poor performance of the state 
enterprises and the rapid aging population. Secondly, the urban workers are the primary 
support for the Chinese political regime. The financial difficulties of these workers 
involved in the pension reform may question the governance effectiveness and system 
legitimacy. Thirdly, the need for an enterprise to provide pension but at the same time to 
compete with others in the market has increased since the introduction of economic 
reforms by the state. This has exacerbated the enterprise budget crisis and caused many 
SOEs and COEs into financial distresses.76 However, failing to build up a new pension 
policy will make the state enterprises less competitive or even to the verge of bankruptcy 
and thereafter affect the stability and development of the whole country.  
The Pilot Reform Program 
Between 1995 and 1997, in accordance with Document No. 6, more pilot reform 
programs were implemented. As of the end of 1997, the success of pooling was mostly at 
the industry level. The successful pooling in these industrial groups77 was largely due to 
the similarities of the enterprises within each industry.78 Pooling at the provincial level 
was less successful. Of the thirteen provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities 
that experimented with the pooling of contributions, only three municipalities (Beijing, 
Shanghai and Tianjin) and one province (Hainan) have reported a reasonably harmonious 
                                                 
76 Wang, Yan, Dianqing Xu, Zhi Wang, and Fan Zhai., “Implicit Pension Debt, Transition Cost, Options and 
Impact of China’s Pension Reform: A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis”, World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper series. 2000. 
77 The eleven industries which, with the approval of the State council, achieved social pooling for their 
affiliated enterprises were: railways; communications; water resources; electrical power; post and 
telecommunications; construction; coal mining; banking; non-ferrous metal; civil aviation; and petroleum 
and natural gas. 
78 For example, since all enterprises within the railway industry, regardless of the province in which they 
were located, had similar wage levels and demographic profiles, there was little concern about one 
enterprise subsidizing another. The similarities also made the administrative task much easier. 
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pooling system. But even in these four localities, the extent of pooling is still 
questionable. 
It was recognized from the results of the pilot program under the guidance of 
Document No. 6 that the lack of standards in implementing the basic pension system 
caused the uneven results.  
Following a series of discussions and experiences learned from pilot tests,79  there 
was a realization that unifying a fragmented pension system and extending the coverage 
to non-state sector was vital to the continued reform and that action was needed 
immediately. In responding to this, the arrangements of the new pension system for urban 
employees were laid down in the 1997 State Council Document No. 26. State Council 
Document No. 26 aims to establish a national unified pension system. It is a “New Deal” 
for Chinese state enterprises. 
Compared with the old system, the new system as detailed in the Document 
introduced the following three important changes:  
1. Extending pension coverage to the entire urban labor force, including the self-
employed. Various industrial specific pension schemes would be incorporated in the 
provincially unified scheme. There would be uniform contribution and benefit rates 
within a province. 
2. The responsibility for the operation of the pension scheme, including the 
keeping of employee records and payment of pensions, would be transferred from 
                                                 
79 Zhao, Yaohui, and Jianguo Xu.. “China’s Urban Pension System: Reforms and Problems,” Cato Journal 
Vol. 21, No. 3. (Winter 2002): 395-414. 
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enterprises to social insurance agencies. The process is known as “She Hui Hua Fa 
Fang”80 in China. Social insurance agencies at the provincial and municipal levels are 
territorial subsidiaries of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.  
3. The new pension scheme would be multi-tiered. The benefit structure is listed 
in Table 2.1.  
                                                 
80 The term She Hui Hua Fa Fang is opposite to the old system in which the government distributed the 
pension to the retirees. She Hui Hua Fa Fang (社会化发放) means that the social insurance agencies 
would distribute the pension to the retirees.  
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Table 2.1: The Three- Pillar Pension System of China 





a) 13 per cent pre-tax revenue of the 
enterprise 
b) Paid from a social pool financed by 
employer contribution  
c). Funding mode: PAYG 
d). Government making up any deficit 
A minimum 
of 15 years of 
contribution 
a) Defined Benefit;81 
b) Replacement rate of 
20 per cent of the 
prevailing average 









a) 7 per cent of employer contribution of 
pre-tax of total enterprise revenue; 
b) 4 per cent82 of employee monthly wage; 
c) Funding model: Pre-funded, in principle 
but not yet practised; 
d) Financed jointly by employers and 
employees 
A minimum 
of 15 years of 
contribution 
or lump-sum 
if it is less 
than 5 years 
a) Defined 
Contribution;83 
b) Replacement rate of 
38.5 per cent of the 
prevailing average 







Pillar 2  Employer Contributions Not required a) Defined Contribution b) Employer Sponsored 
Not 
Operational 
Pillar 3  Employee Contributions Not required Voluntary Not Operational 
(Source: This table is compiled from interviews conducted among government officials of TJBOLSS and TJSI from November 2003 to January 2004)
                                                 
81 Defined Benefit (DB) and Defined Contribution (DC) are two corporate pension schemes. For further readings, see Alexander Michaelides and Francisco Gomes,  
Aggregate Implications of Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Systems, available from http://faculty.london.edu/fgomes/dbdc.pdf, accessed on May 26, 2005 
82 This rate ranges from 4 per cent to 8 per cent across provinces and cities. The main factors affecting this rate are the dependency ratio in a certain area. If the dependency 
ratio of state enterprises is high in a city, its contribution rate from individual employee monthly wage will be accordingly high. 
83 Op.cit.15. 
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The new system consists of three pillars: 
 1) a defined benefit public pillar for redistribution (Pillar 1 Component A) and a 
mandatory funded defined contribution pillar for each worker (Pillar 1 Component B);  
 2) a voluntary supplementary pension pillar managed by each individual firm 
(Pillar 2);  
3) a voluntary supplementary pension pillar managed by the private insurance 
company (Pillar 3).  
So far, only Pillar 1 is in operation. The objective of Component A within Pillar 1 
is to ensure a minimum living standard above the poverty line for all the retirees. Retirees 
would have a portion of their earnings replaced, consistent with their work history and 
contribution. In the long run, it would be financed on a PAYG basis by a 13 per cent of 
contribution from enterprises going into a municipal or provincial pooled fund. This 
would guarantee a replacement rate at 20 per cent of the prevailing average wages at the 
time of retirement for workers with a minimum of fifteen years of required contribution. 
Component B within Pillar 1 is an individual account funded by a payroll tax of 11 per 
cent. 84  At retirement, the workers would receive a monthly pension equal to the 
accumulated account balance divided by one hundred and twenty months. Based on the 
funded pillar (Pillar 1) and the individual contributions (Pillar 3), a worker who has 
                                                 
84 Among these 11 per cent, 7 per cent are from employers. The rest 4 per cent are from employees, 
increasing by 1 per cent every two years up to 8 per cent as a maximum. Data obtained in interviews 
conducted in TJBOLSS and TJSI on December 12, 2003 
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worked for thirty-five years is expected to be provided with a replacement rate85 of 38.5 
per cent. Of the 38.5 per cent, Pillar 1 provides 58.5 per cent to the workers. 
However, problems persist. For example in Tianjin, in the basic benefit scheme 
(Pillar 1), state enterprise workers are supposed to contribute 4 per cent to 8 per cent of 
their wage bills86. Their employers’ contribution has a variation from 20 per cent to 30 
per cent of their employees’ wage bills. As such, the average pension contribution of an 
enterprise varies from 300 RMB to 550 RMB per capita depending on the mean wage of 
each enterprise. However, the unprofitable enterprises interviewed in Tianjin largely do 
not possess sufficient financial resources to submit their monthly pension fees even 
though some regulations and policies may exempt them from part of their duties. This 
situation is even worse in the small to medium-size SOEs and most COEs. A preliminary 
investigation on SOE/COE pension policy implementation shows that in some enterprises, 
their employees have taken the responsibilities to contribute pension fees not only for the 
individual share but also for their enterprises’ share. This practice reveals that SOE/COE 
workers are the actual undertakers of their own pension fees in loss-making public firms. 
The Chinese government realized the problems of the new pension policy and 
took further adjustment to revitalize the pension system. The most recent amended plan 
for China’s pension reform was defined in the State Council Document No. 42 in 2000. 
Based on this document, a pilot program is currently running in Liaoning Province, one 
province which has the heaviest financial burdens in China due to the large number of 
state enterprises. This program aims to retain 20 per cent of the enterprise contribution 
                                                 
85 The replacement rate means monthly pension received divided by last month salary at work. 
86 According to the interviews among government officials conducted in Tianjin, there is some variance on 
contribution rate across different regions. Interviews are conducted in TJBOLSS on December 12, 2003. 
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into the social pooling fund. By enriching the social pooling fund, it paves another way to 
lessen the pressure on the notional individual accounts87. This is done in light of the large 
number of existing pre 1997 pensioners and their blank individual accounts. In this 
program, it requires (1) the segregation of the management of individual accounts from 
the administration of the social pooling funds in order to restrain the growth of notional 
individual accounts; (2) employers to contribute up to 30 per cent of the workers’ wages 
to the pension fund for those exceeding fifteen years’ working. Workers will be paid at 20 
per cent of their wages for their first fifteen years of work, and an additional accrual rate 
of 0.6 per cent per year until 30 per cent is reached.  
This program is expected to have the deficit made up by the improved compliance 
efforts of SOEs, municipal and provincial reallocations, and financial transfer from the 
central government and the National Council for Social Security Fund (NSSF). If the 
Liaoning experiment is successful in solving current financing issues, the government 
hopes to replicate its experience to the entire country.88 
2.3 Challenges of the New Pension Scheme  
Pension reform in China has attracted a lot of attention around the world due to 
the significance of this issue. This could be contributed by the following reasons: 
       1. China’s aging population has been increasing for the last twenty years. 
                                                 
87 The term Notional individual accounts (Kong Zhang) are created by Chinese scholars. It refers to the 
empty individual accounts in the pension fund. Money of individual accounts is used to pay retirees instead 
of saving for the working-age people themselves. For further details, see Institute of Demography, Liaoning 
University. Implicit Debts of Chinese Social Security System, available from National Council for Social 
Security Fund at http://www.ssf.gov.cn/NewsInfo.asp?NewsId=223, accessed July 4, 2003 
88 Estelle James, “How can China Solve its Old-Age Security Problem? The Interaction between Pension, 
SOE and Financial Market Reform”, Proceeding paper on the conference on financial market reform in 
China, Massachusetts, September, 2001. 
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Solving the “white-hair wave”89poses a real challenge to not only China but also all 
countries in the world. Due to the extremely large population in China, its old-age 
security is very much related to the well-being of its people and security in other regions. 
       2. Poor performance of SOEs in China caused financial distresses on pension 
funds. Public firms are the main pillar of Chinese state business. They employ the 
majority of Chinese workers, especially in important industries, such as mining, 
manufacturing, oil, shipping and others. The unfunded pension system will reduce the 
social stability and also the legitimacy of the present government. Financing pension 
system is a high priority so as to protect and maintain state legitimacy and social stability. 
       3. Notional individual account is a major flaw in the existing pension scheme. 
Due to the financial difficulties of both the government and state enterprises, this new 
pension policy cannot resolve the problem of the implicit pension debt (IPD) 90 
accumulated over the years. Chinese state enterprises have a long history of bad business 
performances. They have failed to pay the notional individual account. 
       4. In addition, scholars have criticized the fragmented pension system, 
incomplete social pooling, high pension contribution rates91, narrow and uneven coverage 
across regions.92These issues will be explained in the chapters 3 and 4. 
                                                 
89 See Organization and Personnel. How to deal with “White-hair” Wave?  Available from 
http://www.emm.com.cn/zznews/Shownews1.asp?num=rsb-200412315336, accessed August 27, 2004. 
90 Ministry of Labor and Social Security,  Shiji Jueze: Zhongguo Shehui Baozhang Tixi Goujia.(Century 
Dilemma: China’s Social Security System), Beijing: China Social Security Press. 2000 
91 According to interviewees in Tianjin,  the current contribution rate (e.g., in 2003, the rate reaches 38 per 
cent) may cause the evasion of state enterprises and a heavy burden on the society. Interviews were 
conducted on November 21, 26, 29, 2004 
92 China’s pension system mainly covers SOE and COE workers in urban areas. For rural area, there is no 
government-conducted pension scheme. For more information, refer to chapter 1. 
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2.4 Objectives and Problems 
Looking back at how China pension reform has evolved to its present state, the 
following three objectives are at the heart of the projected reform:  
- Expanding pension coverage to non-state sector speedily 
- Unifying pension programs by moving pooling from the city level to the 
provincial level through risk sharing 
- Relieving enterprise burden by gradually reducing its contributions.  
The urgency attached to the expansion of coverage and unification of pension 
systems reflected the financial trouble the pension system has been experiencing. For the 
government, reform efforts to pursue the above three objectives would help provide extra 
funding by receiving fund contributions from the private sector. They will also reduce the 
financial burden of SOEs and improve their competitiveness. Finally, it may improve 
labor market mobility by expanding pooling coverage from state to non-state sector and 
from the city level to the provincial level. For instance, if private sector workers were to 
be brought fully into the system, pension deficit crisis in the state pension system could 
be alleviated. This is because private firms have a much younger work force with far 
fewer retirees. Each enterprise would contribute according to its wage bill and all pension 
costs would be covered out of the broader municipal pool of funds. Flourishing young 
enterprises would help to subsidize failing older enterprises.  
However, the reform missed the most fundamental issue from the very beginning, 
namely, it has ignored the existing pension debts in the transitional period. Solving the 
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old debt issue is never a simple thing for any country that has shifted from a PAYG 
system to a multi-pillar system. In ignoring the old debt, it can only increase transitional 
costs and problems. In the meantime, it may pave the way to more economic disincentive 
and political resistance. This is because a failure to achieve expected outcome each time 
would reduce government reform credibility and affect public confidence in the system. 
       Evidences of provincial pooling implementation have shown that reform 
progress is slow. First, provincial pooling is still fragmented after years. Not every 
province has completed pooling. Most of them are pooled at the city level. For example, 
by mid-1999, only four municipalities (Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai and Tianjin) plus 
Hainan province, among the 31 provinces in China, have achieved full pooling. Most of 
the other provinces remain at great variation in terms of contribution rates, administration 
and management.93 Second, only less than 50 per cent of the urban labor force across the 
whole country has participated in provincial pooling. 94  Third, major problems have 
emerged under the pooling arrangement. These include growing pension deficits and 
inability to fund the individual accounts, moral hazards under the decentralized pension 
administration system, and inefficient pension fund investment, low compliance rate and 
high evasion rate.95 
The inability of solving the pension debts issue has created incentive problem that 
affects the successful operation of the provincial pooling system over the years. If the 
new pension system was introduced to an entirely new labor force, it will not have any 
                                                 
93 Yin, Jason, Shuanglin Lin, and David F Gates, Social Security Reform: Options for China. (Singapore: 




transitional issues, nor will it face the problem of notional individual accounts. Like other 
countries moving from PAYG system to a new pension system, China faces the problem 
of what to do with old and transitional workers while implementing a new system. 
However, what differentiates China’s reform from other countries is that China does not 
have much support from a mature capital market. This makes solving transitional issues 
even more challenging. The 1997 State Council Document No. 26 officially launched a 
nation-wide new pension system with priorities in dealing with the transition issues. 
According to the proposed system, benefit formulas are grouped as follows: 
- New workers entering the labor force after 1997 will receive a combined 
pension income of the socially pooled pension benefit plus the individual account-related 
monthly benefit, provided they have 15 years of creditable service. 
- Middle workers (those who started work before 1997 but had not retired 
by 1997) would get a mixture of the benefits from the new and old system. They would 
receive the same two components as new workers plus a transitional benefit.96  
- Old workers, namely, those who retired prior to 1997, are entitled to 
benefits defined by the former system. They will receive an average replacement rate at 
80 per cent. 
The problem of dealing with old and middle workers lies in the existence of 
notional individual accounts accumulated before the 1997 reform. Therefore, transitional 
problems arise from the financial gap between the revenue generated from the pooled 
system and the promised payment to the pensioners. The amount of transitional cost 
                                                 
96 The traditional benefit comes from the 1.72 per cent of the average wage in the final working year for 
each year of service before 1997. The information was obtained from interviews conducted with the 
government officials in TJMOLSS on November 21, 2003. 
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depends on the length of the transitional period. There will be a period that some old 
pension programs and the new pension program coexist together. After that, the system 
will be completely converted to the new program.97 However, the difficulty China faces 
now is how to finance the pension cost in the transitional period. It is apparent that China 
has not been able to deal with this issue well so far. 
Some have argued that the 13 per cent contribution rate by the enterprises would 
not be enough in the light of 20 per cent replacement rate for Pillar 1 unless China relies 
on early retirement and allows the pension fund to have access to the capital market.98 As 
it is, the system could experience pension deficits in a matter of a few years. As a matter 
of fact, current pension system is already in a deficit position, and it is evident that many 
provincial or local pension pools are financially bankrupt as evidenced by the fact that 
many provincial or municipal pooled accounts have been experiencing deficits over the 
past few years.99 In this regard, it is estimated that more than one half of Chinese cities 
are incurring pension deficits.100 It remains to be noted that places like Shanghai and 
Shenzhen are having surpluses.101 
                                                 
97 Hussain, Athar, Demographic Transition in China and its Implications. World Development Vol.30, 
No.10, 2002: 1823-1834. 
98 It has been estimated that without any parametric changes, China will require a long run contribution rate 
that exceeds 40 per cent, but if China raises the retirement age to 65 both for men and women, switches to 
price indexation of pensions, changes the annuitization method to become actuarially fair and funds the 
individual accounts, the required long run contribution rate would be cut in half. See Yue Guo, China’s 
Pension System Reform, available from http://www.gu.edu.au/school/gbs/ 
irl/working_party/Papers/Guo_2_.pdf; accessed November 21, 2004 
99 According to MOLSS report of 2001, in 1997, there were 5 cities running pension deficit, and that 
number increased to 21 in 1998, and later to 25 in 1999. 
100 China Security Weekly, available from http://www.globalaging.org/foreignlang/chinese03.htm, July 1, 
2002 
101 Feldstein, Martin, “Social security pension reform in China”, China Economic Review 10 (1999): 99-
107 
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One of the explanations for the inconsistency is because of the fact that pension 
financing problems vary across provinces. Provinces with fast growth and fewer older 
workers are likely to accumulate surpluses than provinces with declining industries and 
large number of older workers.102 If provincial surpluses can surpass provincial deficits, it 
may create a national pension system with a surplus. However, a group of scholars103 
view that deficit provinces receive no cross-subsidies from surplus provinces because the 
current pension scheme is not pooled at the national level. In most cases, provincial 
pension deficits are covered by the central government through budget transfers. 
Therefore, notional individual accounts are more likely to exist in the financially poor 
provinces. For these provinces, percentages of enterprise contribution to Pillar I will not 
sustain the pension payment (basic accounts) to current pensioner (old workers plus 
middle workers) even in the short term. The reasons are: 
       First, it is hard to imagine that enterprise contributions will be sufficient to 
support the 75 to 80 per cent of income replacement rate for old and middle workers 
during the transitional period. 104  Some have argued that this is because the current 
                                                 
102 For example, some argue that while China’s IPD for the country as a whole may be only 70 per cent, the 
IPD relatively to local GDP is probably much more than 100 per cent in regions that once flourished but 
now are burdened with declining industries and old non-functioning state enterprises. See Estelle James, 
“How Can China Solve Its Old-age Security Problem? The Interaction Between Pension, SOE and 
Financial Market Reform”, Proceedings on the Conference Financial Market Reform in China, 
Massachusetts, September 11-13, 2001 
103 See Xiang Huaicheng. The Duty of Chinese Social Security. Available from 
http://www.zfcg.net.cn/cj/cj_show.asp?id=1482, accessed December 22, 2003. 
104 The promised benefit level to current pensioners and middle workers pensioners in China is about 75-80 
per cent of final year’s wage, compared with 40 per cent in the US and 50 per cent in many countries. 
However, many pensioners in China live in poverty. The average wage was low until the early 1990s. Full 
pensions are slightly higher than the local poverty line. They are getting what is needed to sustain a socially 
acceptable living standard. For example, in Beijing city, the minimum pension is set as RMB 441 per month 
in 2001. The information was obtained from interviews conducted in MOLSS, Beijing on December 13, 
2003. 
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pension system exists in principle and that the old system is still in practice.105 This is 
because pensioners from the old system continue to receive their old benefits and new 
workers enter directly into the new system. Middle workers would use a combination of 
the old and new benefit formula, as they have a short period of contribution and credits 
from previous working years (before 1997). Currently, the old defined benefit formula 
with income replacement rate of 75 to 80 per cent applies to most old pensioners and 
middle pensioners. Their entitlements are unfunded from the previous system and far 
exceed current revenue generated from basic pension pillar I. 
On the average, contributions of enterprises to pillar I was 20.6 per cent of total 
wage in 1996. Having deducted the share going into individual accounts, basic pension 
accounts only received 7.6 per cent of total wage.  
However, actual pension payment out of basic accounts in 1996 was about 18 per 
cent of total wage, and the gap between revenue and expenditure was 10.4 per cent. As 
such, the shortfall requires financing from other sources, such as individual accounts.106 
This is why reserves accumulated in individual accounts over the past few years were 
transferred to basic pension accounts to cover higher costs of paying the pre 1997 
pensioners. The individual accounts remain notional and empty with no assets in them. 
Second, accelerated increase in dependency ratio in recent years is another 
important factor causing pension shortage and notional individual accounts. Data from 
China Labor Statistic Yearbook shows that the dependency ratio in 1983 was 1:8.9 and it 
                                                 
105 Op.cit. 94. 
106 Zhao, Yaohui, and Jianguo Xu. “China’s Urban Pension System: Reforms and Problems.” Cato Journal 
Vol. 21, No. 3. (Winter 2002): 395-414. 
  52
increased to 1:3.5 in 2000. This means 3.5 workers have to support one pensioner now 
compared with almost nine workers supporting one pensioner twenty years ago. The 
number of Chinese pensioners grew at the rate of 6.8 per cent annually since 1983. This 
means that there have been more workers retiring from the workforce than new workers 
joining the labor force, and pension expenditure to current pensioners would exceed 
pension income contributed by new employees. Therefore, the number of retirees 
increases faster than the growth in the working population, making the benefit system 
financially difficult to sustain. 
       Third, Middle workers were required to contribute but they never did before. 
If the government does not finance their pension accounts, their enterprises must do it. As 
such, it becomes an additional burden for the state enterprises. In order to pay for every 
pensioner, many enterprises have opted to skim off money destined for current workers’ 
pensions to meet their obligations to the present retirees first. 
       Fourth, the social pool is managed publicly with the support of individual 
accounts. This practice makes it easier to transfer money to meet the financial need 
created when expenditures on pension must continue. Inter-generational inequity has 
become an issue when 1) current contributions from employees are used to pay for 
present pensioners; 2) contributions to fund pension replacement rates for middle workers 
are higher than what the current employees will get when they retire; 3) future benefits to 
current workers are so uncertain due to an immature financial capital market. 
       Finally, low compliance in contribution to the pension fund has resulted in 
increasing municipal and provincial deficits. For example, in 1998, evasion of 
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contribution and delayed payments reached up to 34.8 billion RMB, about 36.8 per cent 
of total pension payment in 1997.107 Recently, government officials acknowledged that 
reported wage by many firms to social security agencies are sometimes 20 per cent to 30 
per cent lower than actual total enterprise wage. In addition, there was a decline of 
collection rate108 in the last decade. The collection rate was 95.7 per cent in 1992. It 
dropped to 92.4 per cent in 1993, 90.1 per cent in 1995 and 80 per cent in 1998.109 
The Chinese government is facing the most difficult time in financing pensioners. 
The obligation to solve the financial constraints lies on the shoulders of policy-makers 
and implementation agencies. However, what demands more concerns are the future 
retirees who are struggling to raise their families. They are supposed to be the main 
beneficiaries of the pension system. Unfortunately, nobody takes up the responsibilities 
for them other than their loss-making enterprises who have been failing to finance the 
pension fund for them. The worker will not be able to pull themselves out of their 
predicament in spite of the pension system. The next chapter analyzes the situations of 
loss-making state enterprises and their employees in Tianjin, the focus of this study. 
                                                 
107 Vivian Y. Chen, “A Macro Analysis of China Pension Pooling System: Incentive Issues and Financial 
Problem”, Proceedings for International Conference on Pensions in Asia: Incentives, Compliance and 
Their Role In Retirement, Tokyo, Japan, 22-24 February 2004 
108 Collection rate refers to the percentage of the enterprises submitting pension in China. 
109 Guo Chongde. 1993. Pension Insurance in China: Reform and Prospects. Papers presented at the 
Workshop on “Social Security in the People’s Republic of China”, Hamburg. February 5-7, 1993 
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Chapter 3 
Assessing Pension Policy Implementation in Tianjin: 
Systems and Policies 
       China’s recent pension reform called for a well-designed pension payment 
system. As introduced in the first two chapters, the responsibilities of pension 
payment were loaded on both the state enterprises and the workers. However, due to 
the fading business performance of state enterprises, both parties (state enterprises and 
workers) have no financial capabilities to contribute to their portion of pension 
payment. To protect the retirement welfare and workers’ rights, a critical problem for 
each loss-making enterprise is to ensure its financial sources and to maintain normal 
production.  
The existing studies discussed the institutional failures on a macro level 
(provincial-level) during the Chinese pension reform and also the financial imbalance 
among provincial level pension funds. 110  However, there were very few micro 
analyses on the implementation of the new pension policy in loss-making state 
enterprises. This chapter attempts to answer the questions of who paid the pension 
contribution for the current workers in the loss-making enterprises and how the payers 
financed themselves. There are two parts in this chapter. The first part revisits the 
business performance and social roles of state enterprises in Tianjin. Second, it 
elaborates on the pension payment of state enterprises and workers from 1997 to 2003.  
                                                 
110 Wang, Yan, Dianqing Xu, Zhi Wang, and Fan Zhai. 2000. “Implicit Pension Debt, Transition Cost, 
Options and Impact of China’s Pension Reform: A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis”, World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper series. 
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3.1 The Social Role of Public Firms in Tianjin since 1980s 
Tianjin was a typical city with a centrally-planned economic system in China. 
State enterprises were responsible for all social welfare benefits of their workers since 
the 1950s. Urban workers which were the “vital source of regime support for the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP)”111 had their golden age under such a system and 
enjoyed more privileges when compared with peasants. In the centrally-planned 
economic system before the economic reform, state enterprises not only provided 
complete health insurance and pensions but also direct medical care in their own 
facilities or in an attached hospital. State enterprises were also the main source for 
housing. They also provided loans, subsidies, child care, meal services, and, 
sometimes, education; and they were an important source for the procurement of 
certain consumer goods. People employed in the non-state sector were not entitled to 
such a generous array of benefits, although the specific mix varies across enterprises. 
The enterprises were also the main source of certain socio-political services peculiar 
to the communist setting. 112  These included obtaining official certificates of 
permission for workers to travel, getting another job for the worker, getting local 
residence registration for the worker’s spouse or relatives, intervening with public 
agencies on behalf of workers for housing, and attaining higher quality medical care 
or medications, or lessening the punishment for a criminal offense for the worker.113  
However, with the increasing business difficulties of state enterprises, the 
enlarged social role of state enterprises as analyzed above would reduce their 
                                                 
111 Frazier, Mark W., “The Unfunded Mandate of Heaven: The Center, the Cities, and the Politics of 
Pension Reform in China”. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association. Boston, Massachusetts. 2002 
112 Andrew G. Walder. Corporate Organization and Local Government: Property Rights in China, in 
Changing Political Economy: Privatization in Post-Communist and Reforming Communist State, 
edited by Vedat Milor. (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 1994): 53-67. 
113 Ibid. 
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competitiveness in a free market. As such, this new pension policy (1997) was meant 
to regain the economic viability of state enterprises and find out a way to alleviate 
their financial pressures. Unfortunately, the implementation of the new policy did not 
produce any business improvement as anticipated. The asset-liability ratio in some 
SOEs and many COEs are still quite high. New investments into these enterprises 
were even stopped by the state banks due to their low return rate. Consequently, the 
total number of state enterprises and the scope of state economy assets decreased due 
to less funds for investment and poor management. 
Despite major efforts made by the government to lessen the state enterprises’ 
financial burdens, there was still a lack of progress in enterprise performance. The 
data on China Labor Statistical Yearbook (2000) reveals that state enterprises 
accounted for 67.2 per cent of the total number of SOEs participating in the pension 
program.114 This figure dropped from 84 per cent in 1992 to 67.2 per cent in 2000, 
although SOEs are still the predominant contributors to the pension system. Urban 
COE employees (2001) accounted for 14.5 per cent of the total participation number 
in the pension system, whereas other private companies and the self-employees 
accounted for 18.3 per cent. High percentage of state enterprise’s participation in the 
pension system means that financing these state workers has to rely on the state sector 
itself. However, due to the high proportion of pensioners in state enterprises, it is not 
optimistic that pension contribution and distribution will be met by the state.  
The pension contribution of the state enterprises has been declining in the last 
few years. This is caused by several reasons. First, continuing poor financial 
performance and unrealistic high pension benefit make it difficult to finance pension 
                                                 
114 China Labor Statistical Yearbook (2000). National Statistics Press, 2001 
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expenditures. Second, the pension reform did not lead to a great reduction of the 
social security burdens of state enterprises which continue to face high social security 
contribution costs. Third, the downsizing of state enterprises and their privatization 
have led to a massive increase of laid-off workers (LOWs). This automatically 
reduces the size of the current contributing population and makes it even harder to 
support the rapidly increasing number of pensioners with the declining number of 
current workers. Moreover, privatization involves ownership change. After ownership 
has been changed to private-owned or foreign-invested companies, they are no longer 
keen to participate in the current pension program. According to the Chinese laws, the 
Chinese government can only impose strong administrative controls on state 
enterprises but not other types of enterprises in protecting workers’ retirement rights 
and benefits. Therefore, other types of enterprises are not forced to participate in 
contributing to the new pension system. This reduces the contribution to the pension 
funds and also makes the burdens of state enterprises even heavier than ever before. 
The increasing heavy burdens of state enterprises restrict them to compete with other 
enterprises in the market. 
The recent pension reform had a clear goal of reducing social security burden 
of state enterprises by separating social security functions from its production 
function so that these enterprises would be able to enhance its competitiveness in the 
market and attract more new investments. Years of SOE restructuring has shown 
some progress. However, these efforts have not succeeded in ending their operational 
inefficiencies and non-commercial lendings to state enterprises. Poor enterprise 
management and excess labor force are the obstacles in revitalizing many medium to 
large-scale state enterprises. And the pace of reform remained to be concerned with 
the social stability and an inadequate social safety net. The financial performance of 
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state enterprises is still lower than that of the non-state enterprises. Thus, an IMF 
paper noted that the profitability of state enterprises was the weakest among all the 
types of enterprises – state-owned, collectively-owned, shareholding, and foreign-
invested enterprises.115 Foreign-invested enterprises were the most profitable, with an 
operating profits-to-assets ratio of 17 per cent, almost double that of state enterprises. 
As a whole, the profitability of state enterprises from 1994 to 2000 has actually fallen 
and their financial performance was very weak. 116 
Social Benefit Burden of State Enterprises Remains Heavy 
Although the provincial-level pooling of the pension funds has already 
become a significant improvement over the enterprise-based pension system, the 
social security burden of the state enterprises remains heavy. 
Based on some scholars’ studies on current pension system, it is noticed that 
the state enterprises have a double financial burden, namely, financing the current 
pensioners and the future retirement of current workers. The new pension reform did 
not change the nature of pension finance of the state enterprises and their financial 
burdens to fulfill their social roles remains high. According to the State Council’s 
Document No. 26 (1997), the pension contribution rate of state enterprises is 20 per 
cent of the workers’ total monthly salary. However, when taking into account of other 
enterprise social security contributions for unemployment insurance (1.5 per cent), 
medical insurance (9 per cent), work injury insurance (from 0.2 per cent to 1.9 per 
cent), maternity benefits (0.8 per cent) and housing provident fund (from 5 per cent 
                                                 
115 Heytens, Paul J. & Karacadag, Cem, “An Attempt to Profile the Finances of China's Enterprise 
Sector,” IMF Working Papers 01/182. International Monetary Fund. 2001. Using aggregate data, it 
compared profitability of the Chinese industrial enterprises from 1994 to 2000 by ownership. 
116 Ibid. 
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to10 per cent), the overall contribution by employers is between 35 per cent and 42 
per cent of their monthly salary. 
Based on the field study in Tianjin117, the social insurance contribution rate in 
the state enterprises is very much in line with the national average as showed in 
Figure 3.1.118 If the high dependency ratio of state enterprise is counted, their overall 
contribution rate can reach over 50 per cent. If related financial burden is included, 
the percentage is heavier. While unification of the pension scheme has been achieved 
within each municipality, large differences exist across municipalities. Thus, the total 
contribution rate varies from 27 per cent to 50 per cent of wages, depending on the 
locality.119  
Table 3.1: Social Insurance Contribution Rate (Percentage of Wage) in 2002120 
Type of social insurance and others  Employer Employee 
Pension insurance 19 % 7 % 
Unemployment insurance 1.5 % 0.50 % 
Medial insurance   9 % 2 -3 % 
Work injury insurance  0.2 % - 1.9 % - 
Maternity Benefits 0.80 % - 
Housing provident fund  5-10 % - 
Total 35.5% - 42.2% 9.5% - 10.5% 
(Source: Interviews conducted in December 2003) 
How is this rate when compared with the pre-reform days in state enterprises? 
A previous study has shown that the cost of providing social security for the state 
enterprises has risen drastically since 1992. Notably, one of the important factors in a 
study of poor business performance in these enterprises was the rapidly rising salary 
                                                 
117 The third investigation was conducted from November, 2003 to February, 2004. Interviews were 
conducted in TJSI and TJBOLSS on December 1, 5, 17, 2003. 
118 The country-wide average percentage is also from 35.5 per cent to 42.2 per cent. 
119 Lin, Yi. Pension system reform in China: theories and policies. (United Kingdom: Sedgwick Noble 
Lowndes, 1997) 
120 Contribution rate is calculated as a percentage of last year workers' average monthly wage. Also see 
Beijing City Labor and Employment, (Beijing: Beijing Statistics Press). 2002. 
  60
and fringe benefits, such as housing, health care, education, etc.121 during the early 
stage of the reform. The share of benefits in terms of workers’ income in the state 
enterprises was around 35 per cent in 1997, if housing subsidy was added. The share 
could be as high as 50-60 per cent of total monthly income in some cases.122 As 
economic reform went on, the number of state workers was shrinking and the number 
of pensioners was rising. As such, many state enterprises were forced to draw on 
production revenue to finance the increasingly expensive social security benefits prior 
to the pension reform. In order to reduce the cost in financing the benefits and 
improve competitiveness, pension reform was initiated primarily to help keep the state 
enterprises. However, in actual practice, it is not clear if the pension reform has 
achieved its goals since the current social security contribution of state enterprises did 
not reduce their social security cost. Their financial burden remains heavy.  
SOE/COEs’ Poor Financial Performances 
It is not difficult to understand that the poor financial performance and heavy 
social security burden have forced many state enterprises to delay, reduce and even 
default on pension contribution. Moreover, declining SOE/COE employee pension 
contribution accompanying by the rapidly rising number of the pensioners would 
mean that defaults in the pension contribution and delays in benefit payment is likely 
to increase in the future. Unless the central government can impose stringent 
administrative controls and provide extra funds to alleviate the problems, these 
problems cannot be solved in the near future. 
                                                 
121 Jeffrey D. Sachs and Wing Thye Woo, "Understanding China's Economic Performance," NBER 
Working Papers 5935, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. 1997. 
122 Interviews were conducted in SOE 5 and SOE 7 on December 4, 8, 14, 2003. 
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The recent pension reform helps to lay off extra workers and to remove 
impediments to restructure state enterprises. But it had negative effects on current 
pension contributions. The most recent state enterprise reform focused on privatizing 
the small enterprises and commercializing the large ones.  By cutting excess labor and 
shrinking the workforce, the social welfare burdens have been reduced and the 
efficiency of the state enterprises has been promoted. This has become the trend in 
most of the state enterprises as more enterprises started their restructuring programs. 
As a result, the labor force in the state enterprises dropped from 66.4 per cent (1994) 
to 51.1 per cent (2000) of the total work force. In 2002, the number of SOE 
employees was reduced by 5.5 per cent and that of urban COEs was dropped by 12.4 
per cent. At the same time, the employee number in the private enterprises was 
increased by 8.4 per cent compared with that in 1999.123 A set of new data shows that 
number of pensioners covered by the urban pension scheme is 31.7 million and that 
there are 32 pensioners per 100 contributors.124 China Labor and Social Security 
Paper mentioned that the recent restructuring program of the state enterprises and 
their bankruptcy can further shrink pension fund revenue by reducing pension 
contribution directly. As the reform went on, a large number of workers were leaving 
state firms and looking for jobs in other places. For example, in Ding City in Hunan 
province the total number of contributors was 130,000 in 1999. About 300 enterprises 
participated in the pooling fund. The pensioners were 4,200, and the dependency rate 
was 3.1 to 1. However, the enterprise restructuring resulted in the ownership change 
and 117 firms and 12,000 laid-off workers were involved due to the large-scale 
bankruptcy of state enterprises. Rapidly, the actual number of contributors decreased 
to 5,000, and the dependency ratio was dropped to 1:1. 
                                                 
123 China Statistical Yearbook: 2001. (Beijing: China Statistics Publishers. 2002): 220-223. 
124 Interviews were conducted in MOLSS in Beijing on December 12, 2002. 
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The privatization process and restructuring programs also reduced the 
enterprises’ compliance rate. Some enterprises were aggressive in squeezing 
pensioners out of their current program to avoid paying more benefits in the name of 
privatization. Some state enterprises have changed their company names sounding 
more like private or foreign-invested firms in order to make less pension 
contribution.125 Moreover, enterprise bankruptcies and closedown in the recent years 
have left thousands of retirees with little or no pension to live on and many laid-off 
workers without coverage by the current pension system. 
Thus, the current pension system of the state enterprises will not become 
sustainable without a substantial increase in the number of participants from the non-
state enterprises. These are private and foreign-invested enterprises and others. But 
the extension of the program is facing a huge challenge, namely, the credibility of the 
government in paying the pension eventually in return for current contribution by 
workers. Whether this promise can be delivered or not affects not only the current 
contributors, but also the confidence of the non-state sector employees. Given the 
accumulation of notional individual accounts, widespread of delays or defaults on 
pension contribution and payment, there is a serious doubt about the reform. In other 
words, the public confidence in the reform is low. Forcing the workers in joint venture 
enterprises and private enterprises to participate also may not help at least in the short 
and medium term, as there are simply a large number of SOE workers. Raising 
contribution rate is also not financially viable given the fact that the current 
contribution rate is already high.  And, increasing contribution rate would accelerate 
more non-compliance of state enterprises. 
                                                 
125 Interviews were conducted with 2 senior officials in Ministry of Labor and Social Security in 
Beijing on December 12, 2003. 
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3.2 State Enterprises and the Pension Reform in Tianjin 
Tianjin and SOEs 
Tianjin Statistical Yearbook 2003 shows that there were 1625 large to 
medium-scale state enterprises in Tianjin.126 Among them, there were 1534 pure state 
enterprises (94.4%), i.e., enterprises where state capital is 50% or above. The number 
of state enterprises’ workers reduced from 573,100 (2000) to 452,100 (2003). After 
the economic reform, Tianjin still has 1111 enterprises whose ownerships have not 
been restructured, including 1057 local-government controlled enterprises.127   
In Tianjin, the state enterprises have also been experiencing business 
difficulties and financial distresses similar to that of other provinces across the whole 
country. As showed in Figure 3.2, although the pure wage is increasing, the wage 
index, namely, the ratio of the workers’ total wage to living expenses, is actually 
decreasing. 
                                                 
126 Statistical indicators are taken from Tianjin Statistical Yearbook 2003. Tianjin Statistical Yearbook 
2003. Tianjin Statistics Press, 2004 
127 Most of them are COEs 
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Table 3.2 Total Wages of Staff and Workers and Wage Index in Tianjin (RMB Yuan) 
 
Year Total Wage Wage Index 
1978 468.7 100.2 
1980 627.9 144.5 
1985 1064.8 312.3 
1990 2324.1 581 
1991 2594.9 658.6 
1992 3090.4 743.2 
1993 3812.7 849.9 
1994 5177.4 1023.3 
1995 6080.2 1182.0 
1996 6792.7 1241.0 
1997 7211 1253.4 
1998 6812.5 1021.6 
1999 7160.8 962.7 
2000 7612.9 919.0 
2001 8355.6 864.6 
(Source: Tianjin Statistical Yearbook, 1978-2002. Tianjin Statistics Press, 1978-2002) 
The Pension Reform in Tianjin 
Tianjin has implemented its pension forms since April 1987.128 From then on, 
all workers in the state-owned enterprises were forced to join the social pooling of 
pension accounts. In July 1990, the second policy came out to tell workers from all 
the collectively-owned enterprises to join the social pooling program. A pension fund 
to manage the social pooling was initiated in September 1993. It set up the 
contribution proportion of both the enterprises and workers. In early August 1992, 
some foreign-invested companies are dragged into this pooling program to protect the 
pension interests of workers and also to lessen the burdens of state enterprises. The 
local government unified the reform based on the principal of “social pooling and 
individual account” in 1994 and set a series of laws and regulations on the workers’ 
                                                 
128 Tianjin local government regulated pension policy through the government document on “Methods 
on State Worker’s Pension Management in Tianjin”. (Tianjin Guoying Qiye Guding Zhigong Tuixiu 
Feiyong Guanli Banfa, 1987) 
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pension accounts. It stipulated the contribution responsibilities between state 
enterprises and individual workers and also ensured the workers’ pension distribution 
after retirement by setting a set of laws in January 1996. In 2003, the coverage of 
pension scheme reached 80 per cent of all the workers in Tianjin. 
3.3 Policy Content and its Impact on Implementation 
 Guided by the implementation theory of Grindle, the examination on Tianjin’s 
pension policy implementation will first look at the pension policy content and 
analyze its impact on the implementation process.  
 Since 1987, Tianjin has been implementing the pension payment system based 
on the principle of “Collection based on Distribution (yi zhi ding shou)”.129 With this 
principle, a guideline was set for Tianjin’s local pension distribution system. After ten 
years’ practice, it reached its success by distributing the pension to workers timely and 
sufficiently. In conjuctation with the central government pension reform in 1997, 
Tianjin, like other provinces, stipulated a fixed rate on contribution from public firms 
and individual workers.  The worker’s contribution to individual account starts from 4 
per cent of average monthly salary and rises to 8 per cent as a maximum rate in a few 
years’ time. 
 However, due to the financial distress of the loss-making public firms, some 
workers have to submit their pension payment themselves. Their host enterprises fail 
to submit the 20 per cent of pension contribution for the workers. According to 
Tianjin local regulations on pension contribution, if workers’ individual account 
cannot be paid on time annually, the pension benefit level will be reduced due to the 
                                                 
129 Interview was conducted with a government official from TJSI on November 21, 2003. The Chinese 
of this principle is yi zhi ding shou (以支定收). 
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payment arrears. In the fieldwork conducted by this study in Tianjin, one government 
official from TJBOLSS said: 
 We often meet such a kind of situation. Some workers’ host enterprises are 
facing financial difficulties and can’t afford workers’ pension contribution. They are 
really poor and have no money to satisfy individual accounts. Workers usually will 
wait till the business performance of their host enterprise turns better. However, these 
payment arrears will affect a worker’s future pension after his or her retirement. Say, 
if one worker pays regularly on time to his individual account, he will get RMB 800 
after retirement. But if he has 5 years’ payment in arrears, he will receive only RMB 
500-600 according to the policy. 130  
 This policy regulation forces both public firms and state workers to pay 
pension contributions regularly and on time. It did raise the contribution rate to a 
certain extent. However, it also caused some problems when public firms refuse to 
pay or cannot afford pension contributions. As investigated in one loss-making public 
firm in Tianjin, some workers pay for the arrears to their own individual accounts. 
One worker described his situation: 
 I am 55 years old this year. Because my host enterprise has been making 
losses for several years, my individual account has some payment arrears. Now I need 
to retire after 55, government regulates that I can’t retire unless the payment arrears 
in my pension account can be made up. My host enterprise is a really poor enterprise. 
So I need to pay the arrears by my savings in order to retire at 55.131  
 As predicted by policy implementation model, the policy content confines the 
                                                 
130 Interview was conducted on November 10, 2003  
131 Interviews were conducted on November 10, 12, 13, 15 and December 5, 6, 7, 2003 
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actors involved in certain implementation scenario. It also defines the actors’ 
responsibilities by legitimating the policy content. From the interviewee’s story above, 
it can be seen that if one actor refuses to pay, other actors may take over the 
responsibilities to fulfill the role. 
3.4 Pension Reform in Loss-making Public Firms 
On account of the continuous business recession faced by the state enterprises, 
the new pension scheme should not have worked well to sufficiently finance their 
pension pool. The capital assets of the state enterprises and their loss suggest that they 
would not be able to pay the pension fees for their employees. Nonetheless, some 
loss-making public firms in Tianjin are working quite smoothly on the new pension 
policy. Therefore the puzzle is who pays the pension fees if the state enterprises 
cannot afford it and why these payers pay for it.  
Undoubtedly, the workers in the profit-making enterprises do not worry about 
their pension contribution since their enterprises pay the pension contribution 
regularly every month. However, in loss-making enterprises, workers have to urge 
their enterprise to pay for them. In the 4-month fieldwork in Tianjin, the observations 
show that in loss-making public firms, enterprises normally sell properties and 
organize small-scale production to earn money to pay for workers’ pension. In one 
enterprise, one manager revealed how his enterprises survived in paying all kinds of 
social welfare to workers:132 
I was in charge of everything, including tax, pension, and health insurance. 
The most important part is pension contribution to workers’ individual accounts. If 
                                                 
132 Interview was conducted in SOE 9 on November 23, 2003. 
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we pay late, we will receive a fine. And if we refuse to pay monthly pension 
contribution, our workers can’t retire at their right age which is 50 to 60. They will 
go to the street to seek some assistance from the court or government. That will cause 
a lot of trouble to our enterprise. We don’t have too much energy to deal with the 
workers’ protest or government inquiries. So the only thing we can do is to sell or 
rent our properties. We have a 3-level building. Now we rent the first level to one 
restaurant and rent another two levels to some small companies. Because we need to 
pay the pension before the 15th of every month to SI,133 we urge the tenants to submit 
their rental before the 15th of each month. If they don’t submit, then we have to wait 
for the money until they pay us.  
Due to the regulations from the local government, enterprises that pay late on 
workers’ pension every month have to pay a fair amount of fines (3% of the amount 
they should submit). This part of money will be transferred to the city pension fund 
management instead of the workers’ individual account. Therefore, most enterprises 
will pay the pension on time because they will have to come up with more money if 
they have to pay fines. 
However, some loss-making enterprises will refuse or cannot afford the 
pension each month. Some have only a small amount of money and some are at the 
verge of bankruptcy. A worker in one loss-making firm said: 
I know my firm really does not have money. Even the firm manager himself 
has not received his salary for quite a few months. We have sold out all properties 
and now we just wait for government subsidies. But the government has given up on 
                                                 
133 Interviews were conducted on Dec 3, 8 and 9, 2003. SI refers to the district-level social insurance 
agency. 
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us because we are a small-scale SOE. The only thing we can do is to wait, wait and 
wait until some government officials allow us to skip the payment. We can pay 
pension only if we don’t pay the salary of workers. If we pay the salary, then we can’t 
pay the monthly pension contribution. 
In some loss-making firms, the workers choose to pay for themselves the 
monthly pension contribution. This is the only reason sustaining the existing pension 
scheme. A female worker, aged at 49, said that she chose to pay for herself because 
her firm could not afford to pay the pension for her. If no payment is sent to her 
individual account, she could not claim the pension benefit after her retirement in 
about one year.134 Among all the interviewees from the loss-making public firms, 50 
per cent of them chose to pay for themselves. Most of them are laid-off workers and 
do not have other income except for the RMB 200 every month, the payment for laid-
off workers.  
In one case, a worker refused to pay for himself. He said: 
 I know why my colleagues chose to pay for themselves. Because they can’t see 
any hope from our enterprise. But I still don’t understand why the government will 
not care for us since we are also state workers (guo jia gong ren).135 They should 
know that we have worked for half of own life for the state and that our enterprise 
was making losses just for the past few years. According to the law, I shouldn’t pay by 
myself. I will insist not paying for myself and see what is going to happen in the end. 
136 
                                                 
134 Interview conducted on December 16, 2002 in preliminary fieldwork in Tianjin. 
135 Guo jia gong ren (国家工人). 
136 Interview conducted with a worker in a loss-making public firm on November 30, 2003.  
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One of the government officials in charge of the pension fund management 
responded as follows: 
In this case, we will not let him retire according to the law. If his enterprise 
does not pay for him, we cannot proceed with his retirement application. Because his 
individual account is blank, he can’t claim his pension after retirement. We show 
sympathy for his case and we also know his firm is poor. But the only thing we can do 
is to urge his firm to pay for him.137 
In the end, that worker had to choose to pay for himself and made up for the 
amount in his blank individual accounts by his savings. He was sad when he retired. 
He said: 
I never thought that having worked for the county for 40 year, I got no pension 
eventually unless I pay for myself by using my own savings. I can understand why the 
laid-off workers chose to pay for themselves instead of pleading with the firm. 
Although I have made up for the amount in my individual pension account now, my 
pension salary is not high due to the deficiencies for the past years. I will only say to 
other workers who are in a similar case as mine, pay for yourself as early as 
possible.138 
The fieldwork findings also reveal that pension contribution is an important 
concern of the state enterprises. Unless they really have no resources to pay the 
workers’ pension, they will try to pay them on time and regularly because the pension 
is an important component of workers’ benefits. In addition, if a firm chooses not to 
pay the pension for workers, its retired workers cannot enjoy free health insurance. It 
                                                 
137 Interview conducted with one official in TJBLOSS on December 4, 2003 
138 Interview conducted with a worker in a loss-making public firm on December 4, 2003 
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means that the retirees’ health insurance has to be paid by the host enterprise itself. 
But why did some firms still choose not to pay the pension for their workers? Why 
did the workers pay for themselves without complaint? 
In answering these questions, chapter 4 will be using a political economy 
approach which analyzes the policy process among the various politically influential 
forces and interests within the current economic, social and demographic constraints 
and pressures. The reason is that welfare reforms cannot be understood merely on the 
surface. The applicability of other approaches is heavily determined by the deeper 
dynamics which are propelled not only by broad structural changes in the social, 
economic and political spheres, but also by the particular constellation of interests and 






The Local Context of Pension Policy Implementation: 
Power Structure, Guanxi Capital and Social Opportunity 
The fieldwork in Tianjin shows that the workers in the loss-making state 
enterprises are self-raising their individual pension accounts now. By law, these 
transactions are illegal and against the regulations set by the government. Therefore, it 
is important to find the reason why the workers are contributing to their pension 
accounts instead of fighting for their legal rights with the government, court and their 
enterprises. Based on Grindle’s model, the reason should be due to either the policy 
content or policy implementation context, namely, the social and economic context in 
the country. As examined in chapters two and three, the policy content itself does not 
have any violation of labor rights. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the 
implementation context, which probably can explain the formation of the distorted 
policy outcome. By investigating the implementation context, this chapter will come 
up with a generalization of the case study materials in Tianjin on how and why 
contextual variables intervene in the implementation process in the new pension 
reform. 
As elaborated in chapter one, policy implementation is an ongoing process of 
decision making by a variety of actors. The ultimate outcome of which is determined 
by the content of the program being pursued and by the interaction of decision makers 
and implementers within a given politico-administrative context. Based on the 
analysis in chapter one and Grindle’s model, Figure 4.1 shows the relationships 
among policy content, policy implementation context and policy implementation 
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outcome. 
Figure 4.1: Politico-administrative Process of Policy Implementation139 
 
Based on this model, the field work in Tianjin mainly focused on the actors in 
pension policy implementation, namely, the three contributors of workers’ pension 
accounts. They are: 
1. Government Institutions, including but not limited to the local government, 
local courts and fund supervision authorities; 
2. State enterprises; 
3. Workers. 
4.1 The Implementation Context 
According to the general model above, the implementation context includes:140 
                                                 
139 For details, see M. S. Grindle, “Policy Content and Context in Implementation”: 68; see also the 
analysis in chapter one, pp 5-7. 
140 See also D. Van Meter and C. Van Horn, “The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual 
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- power, interests, and strategies of actors involved; 
- institution and regime characteristics; 
- compliance and responsiveness. 
For this study, the above three context components are the independent 
variables of this thesis. To be more specific, they are: 
- power structure among actors; 
- social network possessed by actors in the implementation process; 
- social opportunities outside the state enterprises. 
Twenty-six state enterprises were investigated in Tianjin in the three-month 
fieldwork from November 2003 to February 2004. Among them, there are fourteen 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and twelve collectively-owned enterprises (COEs). 
The industrial fields of these enterprises are shown in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Industrial Fields of Twenty-six State Enterprises in Tianjin 
Industrial field Number 
Commercial Service 5 
Commodity Manufacture (e.g., Textile, Food, Watches) 5 
Construction 1 
Communication and Information Technology 2 
Plastic Industry 5 
Steel and Iron metallurgy 5 
Transportation 3 
Face to face interviews were conducted, including all the managers and 
pension functionaries of these state enterprises. This study also interviewed eleven 
high level government officials from Tianjin Social Insurance Center, Tianjin Bureau 
(ju) of Labor and Social Security, Tianjin Bureau (ju) of Finance, and six district-level 
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social insurance centers. Phone and personal interviews were conducted with the 
retirees and employees from these state enterprises as well. 
4.2 The Power Structure 
Power performs differently in various types of political system. The 
implementers need to be aware of the power distribution in the society that influences 
policy outcome. China is regarded as a close-system in Grindle’s model of political 
system, characterized by the following:  
- The state apparatus itself monopolizes economic and social power in the 
society and retains the full discretion over policy initiatives 
- Its policies generally respond to the institutional interests of the group that 
dominates the government machinery.141  
In such a system, it is common that policy recommendations on economic 
development or national security are prejudiced by the existing social and economic 
patterns. It is also known that government policies in the close system are usually 
inconclusive, and determined by the behavior of different interest groups. 
Interestingly, although a unified core may dominate organized political activity in the 
country, such a system may not have sufficient power to force compliance from 
disorganized but wary people who think that the government is not responding to their 
particular needs.142 These are recognized by Oksenberg and Lieberthal that different 
pressures and influences shape the behavior of officials at each level.143 They also 
found that the reforms in China have increased the financial resources available for 
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various units to undertake activities outside of the state plan. This has increased the 
opportunities for units to use their efforts on state-mandated activities. The case of 
Tianjin verifies Grindle’s model of the power structure in the Chinese pension reform.  
The investigation results prove that there is a power imbalance among 
government institutions, state enterprises and their workers. It is obvious that 
government institutions are on the highest power level in terms of resources owned 
and working conditions. As mentioned by one of the interviewees from TJBOLSS, 
“We, TJBOLSS and TJSI are government offices and policy-making centers. 
We are at a higher level than other actors in the pension plan because we own more 
resources than them in terms of authority and legitimacy. Our office equipment and 
environment are much better than the enterprises” 144 
On the other hand, state enterprises are financially difficult due to the 
unprofitable business performance, which has affected the workers’ living conditions. 
One worker described his factory as follows: 
We are really poor, and poorer than what people could imagine before they 
saw the factory. You know, it is mid-December in North China now. The temperature 
on the street is below zero. Can you imagine that we don’t have any heaters at all? No, 
we don’t. Both our plants and offices are without any heaters. So, we don’t have warm 
water in such a cold weather. We must bring some hot water from home. We wear 
cotton-wadded jackets which are already out of fashion. Our manager and his office 
is in the same condition.145  
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In another factory, the manager showed the author his office. It was a small 
shabby room, no heater inside but an old coal stove only. His lunch was brought from 
his home.146  
In loss-making state enterprises, managers always chose to sell their land 
properties to pay workers’ salary if the government was not helpful in coping with 
their situations. An enterprise interviewed by the author was a very profitable 
enterprise before the mid-1990s.147 It became a bankruptcy enterprise in recent years. 
This enterprise has been leasing five stories of its 6-storey office building to other 
tenants. Each office on the sixth storey has only old coal stoves for the managers and 
staff in the winter.  The rest of the workers have to stay at home because there is no 
space to stay and no job to do in the enterprise. There are no subsidies for the laid-off 
workers.148   
Out of the twenty-six state enterprises included in this study, three are still 
making a slight profit. Five enterprises are barely surviving with a fair financial 
balance but no profits. The rest are losing money. It is easy to understand why these 
state enterprises cannot contribute to their workers’ pension accounts. 
The Falling of State Enterprises 
Historically, Chinese state enterprises operated as semi-enclosed communities, 
more akin to the army than to firms in market economies.149 They provided either free 
or a wide range of services at low prices to their current and retired employees, and 
often to their families as well.  Chinese workers in state enterprises were looked upon 
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as a vital source of regime support for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Most of 
the full-time workers in state enterprises received basic workplace injury, maternity, 
and retirement benefits since the early 1950s, when the new government of the 
People’s Republic of China issued regulations on “labor insurance” that encompassed 
various forms of insurance. Prominent amongst these are housing, in- and out-patient 
medical treatment, schooling of children and (in some cases) even public utilities. The 
cash wage has traditionally been just one component of a package with an array of 
benefits in kind.150 
The extended social role of Chinese state enterprises binds much of the urban 
labor force to their respective work units (danwei) as they take care of not merely 
their working lives but also retirement151. This role is increasingly perceived as a 
major barrier in the restructuring of state enterprises. Besides, faced with worsening 
financial conditions in recent years, many state enterprises have defaulted on their 
social obligations, such as pensions to their retirees, and have laid off their employees 
in large numbers. As a result, the urban labor force no longer perceives employment 
in a state enterprise as a secured guarantee of income for life complemented with 
generous benefits in kind. It offers, in Chinese parlance, neither an ‘iron rice-bowl’ 
nor an ‘iron chair’. A manager from an enterprise said: 
“We do want to pay for the pension. We know the pension is critical for 
everyone. For our workers, including myself, the only possible income after 
retirement is the pension. Every month, we need to wait for the cash or cheque from 
those who rent my factory land. If the tenants delay to pay, we also delay to pay the 
pension to our workers’ accounts.  Most of the time, we need to bargain with the local 
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SIs on when to pay. They normally will not agree and warn us that delayed payment 
will incur fines of 0.3 per cent of the contribution amount. This worsens our situation. 
You know, it would be harder for us if we have to pay extra fines? In addition, the 
fines will not attribute anything to our workers’ pension accounts. They are also not 
refundable.152 
The Bottom People: State Workers 
The salaries of the workers in these enterprises are very low.  There is no 
salary promotion at all in the last ten years. The all-in-salaries of the workers in this 
investigation are below RMB 650 (approximately USD 80). The salaries of the laid-
off workers are even lower, ranging from 0 to a maximum of RMB 200. Constrained 
by the financial conditions, workers in the state enterprises are very weak if they want 
to fight for their legal rights. 
4.3 Guanxi Capital 
Actors, namely government institutions, state enterprises and their workers, 
carry different weights in the economic power structure. Of three actors, the weakest 
group, namely, workers, would shoulder the recurring costs of the pension reform. In 
the Chinese context, there is a kind of social capital called “guanxi” capital which 
forms the basis of economic power. 
Guanxi capital refers to the relationships that an individual maintains in social 
networks. It plays a critical role in Chinese economic transactions as well as social 
life153. Oi regards guanxi as the “operational code” to get things done in China.154 The 
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traditional strength of guanxi may stem from the lack of a comprehensive legal 
structure155 , and its recent economic importance may be due to the inconsistent 
enforcement of laws 156 , risk reduction in an uncertain socio-politico-economic 
environment 157 , risk spreading in an economy characterized by shortages, 158  and 
information sharing in imperfect markets. 159  Meals and gifts are common and 
effective methods of cultivating guanxi.160 The associated gift economy is prevalent in 
both urban and rural China.161 
A method to understand guanxi networks and participants is to evaluate the 
location of actors in the network. In the locations of actors in the network, it is 
important to find the centrality of the node which plays a decision role in the network. 
162 
The profit that a person gains in the interaction is measured by the rewards 
received minus the costs incurred. Homans argued that 'no exchange continues unless 
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both parties are making a profit'163, which means that unless each participant finds it 
profitable, the interaction will not continue. The person who experiences a 'loss' finds 
the interaction more costly and will have an incentive to withdraw. A sustained social 
relationship, therefore, rests upon a balance of mutual profitability. Participants in 
social interaction engage in a calculation of rewards and costs and the interaction will 
continue in a stable form only if all participants are making a profit. Those who 
experience a loss will withdraw and will seek out alternative interactions where they 
are more likely to earn a profit.  
4.3.1 State Enterprises vs. Government Institutions 
When we look at strategic interactions between state enterprises and 
government institutions, the government institutions are undoubtedly the node in the 
social network. After all, these institutions hold all the resources and the ultimate 
interpretation of policies.  
In the pension reform, due to the historical debts and financial constraints of 
state enterprises, they are in a disadvantage position in the network. Accordingly, the 
government is not willing to provide loans to maintain such enterprises. In this study, 
it was found that state enterprises had to bribe the government officials to exempt 
their historical pension debts. After the exemption of their debts, they can have a new 
start by paying just the current monthly pension contribution. As such, they can lessen 
their burdens and pay the salaries of their workers. Hence, these enterprises have no 
bargaining power in negotiating with the government institutions on policy and 
finance.  
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4.3.2 Workers vs. State Enterprises 
The workers of state enterprises know that their enterprises are losing money. 
A worker said: 
Our factory has not produced any products for the last two years. Usually, 
workers have nothing to do for months. Sometimes, our factory calls us to work 
because of some small orders. After that, we have to go back home and wait for 
further notice. The factory is leasing the building and plants to earn some money. Our 
factory also opened a restaurant to earn money. I know they are raising money from 
all kinds of possible places to pay our pension every month. So everybody knows that 
squeezing the enterprise has no effect.  Complaints to the enterprise do not work.164  
The case study shows that many workers become less dependent on their 
enterprises. In response to the question of why they choose to pay their pension 
accounts, a worker, aged 48, replied: 
My salary is very low, below 600 RMB every month.  I need to raise my family. 
Unfortunately, my wife is in the same enterprise. We are both in difficulties. However, 
we have to pay the pension accounts by ourselves. If we don’t pay, we cannot retire. If 
we don’t pay the required amount, our future pension will be discounted. So if we pay, 
at least we can earn a stable pension every month. I am 48 now. If I pay for myself, I 
can retire in a few years later and enjoy my stable pension at that time. We will 
consider this option for paying the pension accounts seriously, especially for those in 
their 40s.165  
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4.3.3 Workers vs. Government Institutions 
In this study, it was also found that most of the workers did not sue their 
enterprises in the courts. Their explanation was that they knew the enterprises could 
not pay for them at all. Some took their actions to the street and organize strikes. 
Occasionally it might work. However, the government recently stipulated that it is 
illegal to strike without government permission and offenders will be arrested by the 
police force. The government will regard these protesters as offenders obstructing 
public transport.166 After this stipulation, there are no more strikes now.  
Workers are the weakest. An important reason is that they do not have social 
network or Guanxi with the legal institutions. On the other hand, government officials 
have more Guanxi in the courts. Even though there were some lawsuits on pension 
contribution against the government, they were unsuccessful. One government official 
explained:  
First of all, they are not familiar with the pension policy. The government in 
charge of pension policy knows much more than they do. Second, the government and 
the court are acting together on these cases to strengthen their power and protect 
their legitimacy. Because once a case is won, other SOE workers will sue in the same 
way and hope for the same results. It will cause troubles to both the government and 
courts.167 
4.4 Social Opportunity 
Some scholars argue that the government should release more job 
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opportunities to the workers.168 They regard the expanding job market can solve the 
financial problems of these workers. However, this study shows that there is actually 
no vibrant job market to employ many state enterprise workers. In fact, workers are 
still at the bottom level. 
Constrained by their age, technical skills, guanxi and social insurance problem, 
interviewees in this study cannot take advantage of these job opportunities created by 
the economic reform. 
1. Age matters 
Respondent A: I am 45 years old this year. It is very hard for me to find 
another job. Other companies only recruit young people. Normally, their age limit is 
35 years old.169  
2. Skills and capabilities matter 
Respondent B: My age can’t meet their requirements from the recruitment 
advertisements. They only ask for those below 35-year-old. Some jobs may recruit 
older people. But they are cleaners for gardens and condominiums. My health will not 
allow me to do those heavy jobs. And actually cleaners’ wage is not high enough for 
me to raise my family.170  
3. Social welfare matters 
Respondent C:  Although I am absolutely not satisfied with the current job and 
enterprise, I have no choice but to stay with it. If I quit this job, my accumulated 
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pension account will end and so will my health account. It is not a cost-effectivet 
decision for me to leave my current enterprise. I would rather stay here and earn a 
small  salary.171  
4. Guanxi capital matters 
Respondent D: I can’t quit my job and start my own business on the street. 
Because of the transportation regulations by the local government, we are not allowed 
to start small businesses, say selling breakfast along the street. If we break the law, we 
will be punished. And we have to pay a big amount of fines. We simply can’t afford it. 
We don’t know any government officials. Our business could be destroyed by them.172  
Rational choice theorists see social interaction as a process of social exchange. 
As it is not possible for individuals to achieve all the things that they want, they must 
also make choices in relation to both their goals and the means for attaining these 
goals. They act within specific and given constraints and on the basis of the 
information that they have about the conditions under which they are acting. 
Individuals must anticipate the outcomes of alternative courses of action and calculate 
which option will be best for them. Rational individuals choose the alternative that is 
likely to give them the greatest satisfaction173. 
In the case of pension reform, workers are exposed to an open social context 
to exchange and interact with other actors. Nonetheless, realistically speaking, 
workers, after balancing cost and benefits, might choose to stay in their enterprises.  
4.5 Summary  
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This chapter has dealt with the power structure, Guanxi capital and social 
opportunities in the implementation context in Tianjin. Table 4.2 shows the context of 
the three actors in the Chinese pension reform. 
Table 4.2 Pension Policy Implementation Context in Tianjin 
 Government 
Institutions 
State Enterprises Workers 
Power Structure Strong Medium Weak 
Guanxi Capital Strong Medium Weak 
Social Opportunities 
(alternative job opportunities) 
- - Few 
 The conclusion of this study shows that Chinese pension reform is constrained 
by several factors. To adjust the policy outcome, it requires a long time to restructure 
the social and economic system and energize the economic market for the workers. 
These adjustments cannot be completed in a short time. Therefore, Chinese state 
workers, especially those from loss-making state enterprises, have to take care of 
themselves until the government has further policy actions to improve the situation. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion: Policy Content and Context in Implementation 
It is a normal and ongoing process of the government to make deliberate efforts to 
bring about changes in public policies and in the structure and function of public 
institutions.174 On the government side, a policy reform is a pathway towards building 
and maintaining its legitimacy and social justice. However, evaluations on the policy 
process reveal that not the entire deliberate efforts yield benefits and moral justice. The 
policy outcome, especially the benefits and social justice assistance to the weak group, 
will at times not be fully achieved. It could be distorted by the internal and external 
factors within the politico-administrative context.  
5.1 A Brief Review of the Study  
This thesis documented the pension reform over the past decade in China. 
Through the investigation of loss-making state enterprises in Tianjin, it verifies Grindle’s 
framework by analyzing the three actors within the implementation process.  This study 
echoes on the role of implementation context in shaping reform agendas and progresses.  
One of the targets set in the pension reform aimed to solve the financial 
difficulties of state enterprises. However, failing to protect workers’ pension interests in 
those loss-making enterprises revealed the administrative incapacity of the local 
government and brought out challenges to its legitimacy. The pension reform was also 
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expected to alleviate the financial pressure of the state enterprises. Unfortunately, the 
liabilities of state enterprises are still very high. Workers in this study are taking care of 
their own pension accounts, which is obviously a failure of the new pension policy.  
5.3 Retrospections on the Theoretical Framework: Does the context really matter? 
This study focuses in the political economy of the pension reform. The policy 
context - power structure, Guanxi capital and social opportunities – are analyzed. Figure 
5.1 highlights that pension performance is determined by the factors of socio-economic 
development. 
Figure 5.1 Pension Performance175 
 
In this figure, pension performance is influenced by economic development, 
government behaviours, demographic dynamics, culture and tradition, labor market 
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conditions and pension arrangements. The fieldwork in Tianjin verifies that all these 
factors produced an unsatisfied pension performance. Aging population, business 
difficulties in state enterprises and also the social or legal structure in Tianjin were 
discussed in the previous four chapters. Together, these actors distorted the original 
policy design. No matter what the policy makers wanted to achieve by the new pension 
policy, the workers had no choice but to pay for their future retirement in the end. It 
demonstrated how the policy context can distort the original policy content during the 
implementation process.  
5.4 The Recommendations for Further Studies 
There are several important issues that need further investigation. They are as 
follows: 
a. This investigation was only conducted in Tianjin. Further investigations 
therefore should be conducted in other regions of China to improve the effectiveness of 
the analytic framework of this thesis, and to confirm the observations in loss-making 
public firms. 
b. For a broader generalization of China’s pension reform, foreign-invested firms 
and private firms could be included in further studies. The compliance or evasion of these 
firms could provide new evidence to judge whether the entire pension scheme is fair and 
successful.  
c. It is always desirable that research projects can offer policy recommendations. 
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This study is a small-scale investigation. Limited by the investigated area, this thesis is 
not in a good position to provide any solutions to loss-making enterprises. Further studies 
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Appendix A : Interviewee List 
  
 
S/N Position From 
1 Director (Pension Department) Ministry of Labor and Social Security 
2 Senior Officer Ministry of Labor and Social Security 
3 Executive Ministry of Labor and Social Security 
4 Executive Ministry of Labor and Social Security 
5 Head of Bureau Tianjin Bureau of Labor and Social Security 
6 Director (SOE Labor Force) Tianjin Bureau of Labor and Social Security 
7 Executive Tianjin Bureau of Labor and Social Security 
8 Dean Tianjin Social Insurance Fund Center 
9 Senior Officer Tianjin Social Insurance Fund Center 
10 Senior Officer Tianjin Social Insurance Fund Center 
11 Senior Officer Tianjin Social Insurance Fund Center 
12 Senior Officer Tianjin Hexi Social Insurance Fund Center 
13 Senior Officer Tianjin Heping Social Insurance Fund Center 
14 Senior Officer Tianjin Hebei Social Insurance Fund Center 
15 Senior Officer Tianjin Hongqiao Social Insurance Fund Center 
16 Senior Officer Tianjin Hedong Social Insurance Fund Center 
17 106 workers State enterprises in Tianjin 
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Gender：□Male □Female                     
Age：____ 
Occupation：_______                        
Education Level：_________ 
Working Year：_______                      
Interview Date：____________ 
Interview Starting At：_______AM/PM          
Interview Ending At：______ AM/PM 




1. In which year did your firm join the social pooling pension system? 
2. In which year did your firm begin to establish the pension individual account for each 
worker? 
3. How many current workers do your firm have from 2000-2003? How many laid-off 
workers do you firm have now? How many retired workers do your firm have now? 
4. Monthly pension contribution amount (1997- 2002) 
5. On average, among all the retired workers, how much is their monthly pension? What 
is the lowest amount? What is the highest amount?  
6. Monthly pension distribution amount (1997-2002) 
7. How many workers do your enterprise cover to pay the pension accounts?(If the 
amount has different with Q3a, ask the reason) 
8. How many workers claim pension in your enterprise? (If the amount has different with 
Q3c, ask the reason) 
9. From 1997 to 2003, when your enterprise couldn’t pay pension accounts, what 
measure did the enterprise take to meet the contribution? 
10. How is the business performance of your enterprise? Do you have annual profit? 
11. Did you have loans from state banks? Have you returned the loans? If not, what did 




1. How many times did your enterprise visit SI except pension payments? For what 
reason? 
2. Did you experience any payment arrears in the last 5 years? 
3. (Ask those answering “yeas” in Q2), did you receive any fine bill due to payment 
arrears? 
4. What is the relative policy on payment arrears? 
5. When you meet difficulties in implementing the pension policy, did you complain to 
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the SI or TJSI or TJBOLSS? If Yes, about what reason? 
6. Did the SIs or TJSI contact with your enterprise in the last 5 years? For what reason? 
7. In your memory, did the SI or TJSI organize any meetings to solve the payment arrears 




1. As a state enterprise manager, what are your comments on the current pension system? 
(Compare with the old system) 
2. Do you have any benefit from the new pension policy? 
3. Do you have any difficulties when submitting the pension contribution to workers’ 
individual accounts? If yes, how did you solve it? 
4. Do you have any difficulties when implementing the pension policy? 
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Gender：□Male  □Female                    
Age：____ 
Occupation：_______                        
Education Level：_________ 
Working Year：_______                       
Interview Date：____________ 
Interview Starting At：_______AM/PM          
Interview Ending At：______ AM/PM 
Ownership of Host Enterprise：SOE    COE  
 
 
Part One: Workers 
 
1. How much is your basic salary currently? Do you have any bonus? 
2. How much do you contribute to your individual account every month? 
3. How much does your enterprise contribute to your individual account every month? 
4. What are your comments on current pension policy? 
1．Did you experience any salary arrears in the last 5 years? 
2．How much is your expectation on your future pension? 
 
Part Two: Laid Off Workers 
 
1．How much is your total income every month? 
2．Do you have other job except the job in your host enterprise? 
3．How much do you contribute to your individual account every month? 
4．How much does your host enterprise contribute to your individual account every 
month? 
5．What are your comments on current pension policy? 
6．Did you experience any laid-off allowance arrears in the last 5 years? 
7．How much is your expectation on your future pension? 
 
Part Three: Retired Workers 
 
1．Which year did you retiree? 
2．How much is your total monthly pension? 
3．Do you think your pension amount is enough for your daily life? 
4．How much do you spend every month on food, room rental and transportation? 
5．Do you leave part of your pension into bank savings? 
6．Do you have savings in the banks? 
7．Do you have health insurance? 
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性别：□男  □女                        年龄：_______岁 
部门：___________                       单位编号：_______号 
从事养老金工作的时间：_______年         采访日期：____年____月_____日 






















9． 从 1997-2003年的七年中，企业为在职人员交纳的养老基金的年度报表。 







































1． 请问贵单位自 1997-2003年，有没有向国有银行贷款的项目？ 
2． 请问贵单位自 1997-2003年，向国有银行贷款总额度是多少元？ 




















































性别：□男  □女                        年龄：____岁 
行业：_______                           文化程度：_________ 
工龄：_______年                         采访日期：____年____月_____日 
采访开始时间：_______AM/PM            采访结束时间：______ AM/PM 
（原）工作单位所有制类别：全民 集体 其他 
 
 
第一部分：在职在岗职工 
 
1． 您现在每个月的收入大概是多少元？ 
2． 您现在每个月个人缴纳的养老保险费是多少元？ 
3． 您所在的企业为您缴纳的养老保险费是多少元？ 
4． 您认为现在个人缴纳的养老保险费数额额度合理吗？ 
5． 您认为企业为您缴纳的养老保险费额度合理吗？ 
6． 您每月能够按时领到工资吗？ 
7． 您对退休金的期待大概在多少元？ 
 
第二部分：下岗职工 
 
1． 您现在每个月的收入大概是多少元？ 
2． 您现在有工作吗？ 
3． 您现在每个月个人缴纳的养老保险费是多少元？ 
4． 您所在的企业为您缴纳的养老保险费是多少元？ 
5． 您认为现在个人缴纳的养老保险费数额额度合理吗？ 
6． 您认为企业为您缴纳的养老保险费额度合理吗？ 
7． 您每月能够按时领到下岗补贴吗？ 
8． 您对退休金的期待大概在多少元？ 
 
第三部分：退休职工 
1． 您是哪一年退休的？ 
2． 您每月的退休金多少元？ 
3． 您认为退休金数额合理吗？ 
4． 您每月的生活开支大概有多少元？ 
5． 您每月有积蓄吗？ 
6． 您在银行里有积蓄吗？ 
7． 您享受医疗保险吗？ 
 
